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1NATIONAL INJUNCTIONS AND PRECLUSION
Zachary D . Clopton*
Critics of national injunctions are lining up . Attorney General Jeff Sessions
labeled these injunctions “absurd” and “simply unsustainable .” Justice Clar-
ence Thomas called them “legally and historically dubious,” while Justice Neil
Gorsuch mockingly referred to them as “cosmic injunctions .” Scholars in
leading law reviews have called for their demise . Critics argue that national
injunctions encourage forum shopping, unfairly burden the federal govern-
ment, and depart from the history of equity . They also claim that national
injunctions contradict the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Mendoza to exempt the federal government from offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion—a doctrine that permits nonparties to benefit from a prior finding
against a party from an earlier case .
Critics are right to identify the connection between national injunctions and
nonmutual preclusion . Both of these doctrines describe when judgments can
benefit nonparties . But critics are wrong to see Mendoza as an argument
against national injunctions . For one thing, the rise of nonmutual preclusion
that prompted Mendoza undercuts crucial arguments against national in-
junctions by offering an alternative explanation for the absence of analogous
injunctions in the history of equity . For another, Mendoza was not preor-
dained; instead, it was a highly policy-driven decision . AndMendoza’s policy
arguments were dubious when it was decided and even more dubious today .
Scrutinizing these arguments should make us less comfortable in extending
Mendoza to a new context—as the Supreme Court may be poised to do .
Indeed, this Article goes one step further . The Supreme Court or Congress
should take advantage of the attention on nonparty relief to reconsider, and
overrule, Mendoza . Federal-government litigants do not deserve special
treatment with respect to preclusion in every case, and the existing rules of
preclusion adequately protect the interests purportedly at stake in Mendoza .
Moreover, rejecting Mendoza has feedback effects for the national-
injunctions debate . Overruling Mendoza would not only reduce the need for
national injunctions (because preclusion could do some of the work) but also
provide a framework for limiting national injunctions without eliminating
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David Marcus, Michael Morley, Colleen Murphy, James Pfander, Doug Rendleman, Judith
Resnik, Henry Smith, Norman Spaulding, A. Benjamin Spencer, Jed Stiglitz, Maggie Wittlin,
and Adam Zimmerman, as well as to the Notre Dame Remedies Roundtable, the Junior Feder-
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them completely . This is especially important given recent decisions that
make relying on class actions a tenuous response . More generally, overruling
Mendoza would create a system that is fairer to governmental and nongov-
ernmental litigants alike while reaffirming each branch’s role in the making
of national policy .
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INTRODUCTION
The national injunction is a cause célèbre. Sometimes referred to as ab-
sent-party, nationwide, universal, global, or cosmic, this remedial tool has
attracted attention because it applies to defendants (usually federal-
government defendants) in their interactions with parties and nonparties
alike.1 Federal district courts have issued national injunctions addressing
1 . See, e .g ., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions
and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018); Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunc-
tions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 242 (2017); Suzette M. Malveaux, Response, Class
Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Michael T.
Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts,
97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095
(2017); Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions
and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018). The term “cosmic in-
junction” was used by Justice Gorsuch in the oral argument in Trump v . Hawaii. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 73, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965) (“We have this
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high-profile issues including the Travel Ban, sanctuary cities, and more.2
Commentators have homed in on the national injunction as a target of criti-
cism. Leading the way, Samuel Bray argued in the Harvard Law Review that
the national injunction is inconsistent with the history of equity, and he
called for a strict party-based limit on injunctive relief.3 Concurring in the
Travel Ban case, Justice Thomas adopted Bray’s position and called for an
end to national injunctions.4 Other scholars have criticized national injunc-
tions, while a few have stepped up in their defense.5
Both critics and defenders of national injunctions have acknowledged
the connection between these injunctions and the law of preclusion.6 In par-
ticular, critics of national injunctions have argued that granting an injunc-
tion against the federal government that protects nonparties would be
contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v . Mendoza.7 That
1984 decision held that the federal government is exempt from the doctrine
of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion8—a doctrine that permits plaintiffs
to invoke a prior adjudication in a subsequent action even though they were
not parties to the original suit.9 Because Mendoza says that a nonparty can-
not get the preclusive benefit of a prior adjudication against the federal gov-
ernment, critics argue that the same nonparty should not get the remedial
benefit of a national injunction against the federal government either.10 Pro-
ponents of national injunctions, meanwhile, take pains to distinguish the na-
tional injunction fromMendoza’s requirement of mutuality.11
While scholars of national injunctions are right to see the connection to
nonmutual preclusion, they have failed to appreciate the consequences of
that interaction. A fuller evaluation of the relationship between national in-
troubling rise of this nationwide injunction, cosmic injunction . . . .”). The solicitor general
earlier characterized these orders as “absent-party injunctions.” Reply Brief for Petitioners at
30, Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965).
2 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources that have done considerable work collecting cas-
es).
3 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 420.
4. Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
5 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources).
6. Scholars writing about “agency nonacquiescence” have also observed the potential
connection between preclusion and federal agency behavior. See, e .g ., Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 684–
86 (1989).
7. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
8 . See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 158 (“[W]e agree with the government that . . . nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel is not to be extended to the United States.”).
9 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–33 (1979) (endorsing offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion).
10. For example, Morley’s opposition to national injunctions relies particularly heavily
onMendoza. SeeMorley, supra note 1, at 627–33.
11 . See, e .g ., Frost, supra note 1, at 1112–14.
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junctions and nonmutual preclusion gives a clearer picture of the history and
suggests a new—and perhaps better—way forward.12
First, reckoning with nonmutual preclusion problematizes the received
history of national injunctions. Critics of national injunctions make much of
the fact that such injunctions did not exist throughout the history of equity,
only appearing in U.S. courts in the second half of the twentieth century.13
Before that time, injunctions typically applied to parties (and their privies).
Critics of national injunctions, including Justice Thomas, have suggested
that this history compels a categorical rule barring national injunctions.14
Preclusion also applied to parties and their privies. Under the doctrine
of “mutuality,” nonparties were not bound by judgments, and they could not
benefit from them either. But the twentieth century saw the rise of “nonmu-
tual” preclusion, whereby nonparties could benefit from prior judgments
(against former parties), even though those nonparties could not be bound
by the same judgment. This shift was a policy choice ultimately endorsed by
the Supreme Court.15
The shift to allowing nonmutual preclusion, which reached a crescendo
with Parklane Hosiery Co . v . Shore in 1979,16 means that any earlier history
must be interpreted in light of the different legal environment.17 To wit, the
fact that courts were reluctant to grant injunctions benefiting nonparties
prior to the rise of nonmutuality might mean only that nonparties should
not be entitled to more benefits from injunctions than they receive from pre-
clusion.18 Appeals to this history, therefore, are not such strong reasons to
oppose national injunctions today. This corrective is especially important as
the Supreme Court—and its fair-weather historicism—may soon take up the
issue of national injunctions.19
12. In ongoing work, Alan Trammell has focused on the institutional and structural re-
lationships between preclusion and national injunctions. Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Na-
tionwide Injunctions, SSRN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3290838 [https://perma.cc/M4PC-E5DG]. Central to Trammell’s argument are issues of
nonacquiescence and bad faith. Id . His conclusions dovetail with proposals described infra
Part IV, though arise from a different perspective on the preclusion–injunction connection. As
the scholarly and political conversations about national injunctions continue, these perspec-
tives (and others) will be central to the debate.
13 . See, e .g ., Bray, supra note 1, at 425; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 353.
14 . See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15 . See infra Section I.B.
16. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
17. Indeed, one could find a parallel to this claim in the law of preclusion: a determina-
tion of a purely legal issue is not conclusive between parties if there had been an intervening
change in the legal environment. See Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
18. The timing is also highly coincidental: national injunctions appeared on the scene
exactly as nonmutual preclusion took hold. See infra Part I.
19 . See, e .g ., Transcript of Oral Argument at 73–74, Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(No. 17-965) (discussing national injunctions in the Travel Ban case); Application for Partial
Stay Pending Rehearing En Banc in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit & Pend-
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Second, recognition of the relationship between national injunctions
and nonmutual preclusion suggests a different way to think about the “prob-
lem” of national injunctions. Recall that opponents of national injunctions
have found support for their position in Mendoza’s holding that the federal
government is not subject to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. At a
minimum, a reexamination of the Mendoza opinion reminds us that it was a
highly policy-driven decision, suggesting that it is policy—not some histori-
cal or structural inevitability—that should dictate how the law treats nonpar-
ties.20
I would go further: any inconsistency between Mendoza and national-
injunction practice should be taken as an opportunity to reevaluate Mendo-
za, not the other way around. The policy arguments marshaled in Mendoza
were weak when it was decided. There is no justifiable reason to reflexively
treat federal defendants differently from other defendants for preclusion
purposes, and there are other preclusion doctrines that protect the interests
purportedly at stake.21 Mendoza’s policy arguments are even weaker today,
when tightening rules on court access might prevent judges from granting
relief sufficiently broad to constrain the federal government.22 For these rea-
sons, the Supreme Court or Congress should overruleMendoza.
Even without this change, the preclusion–injunction connection sug-
gests a way that courts might respond to concerns with national injunc-
tions.23 One of the often overlooked strengths of the Parklane regime—from
which Mendoza excepts the federal government—is that it does not declare
that nonmutual preclusion attaches in every case. Instead, it holds that
courts may decline to apply that doctrine if circumstances call for it.24
Among the relevant factors are whether the party invoking preclusion de-
clined to participate in the first suit and whether there were prior decisions
reaching inconsistent results.25
If courts elected to retain the authority to issue national injunctions but
wanted to adopt a new limiting principle, the Parklane regime offers a sug-
gestion: grant injunctions broad enough to protect those nonparties who
ing Further Proceedings in This Court, Sessions v. City of Chicago, No. 17A1379 (U.S. June 18,
2018) (seeking stay of a national injunction in the sanctuary cities litigation).
20. In this way, Justice Thomas had it backwards when he complained that national-
injunction proponents offer only “a policy judgment” rather than “explain[ing] how these in-
junctions are consistent with the historical limits on equity and judicial power.” See Trump v .
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
21 . See infra Sections III.A–B.
22. These limits include changes in the law of Rule 23, standing, personal jurisdiction,
and others. See infra Section III.C.
23. I take up in Section IV.A the consequences for national injunctions ifMendoza were
overruled. In brief, overruling Mendoza might reduce pressure on courts to issue national in-
junctions by offering an alternative channel to protect nonparties.
24 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
25 . See id .; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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would be likely candidates for nonmutual preclusion, but follow Parklane in
questioning any wait-and-see plaintiffs and exercising caution when there
are inconsistent prior judgments.26 In order to ensure universal relief, plain-
tiffs would still have the incentive to include all affected persons in the first
suit, most obviously through a class action.27 If they don’t—or can’t28—then
courts would have the flexibility to protect deserving nonparties by thinking
through the well-known framework for nonmutual preclusion. This preclu-
sion-based approach would avoid the parade of horribles offered by critics of
national injunctions, and instead it would harness plaintiff and defendant
incentives to achieve fair and binding resolutions of important disputes.29
Not only does the linking of preclusion and injunctions have practical
consequences but it also reveals untapped theoretical connections between
remedies and preclusion.30 Critics of national injunctions worry that allow-
ing one district judge to make national law violates some deep principle of
judicial hierarchy.31 While it may be true that a district court opinion would
lack precedential effect in a neighboring district, the American law of judg-
ments shows that this insight is not universally applicable. Under full faith
and credit principles, federal and state courts are bound to recognize the
judgments of other U.S. courts.32 Indeed, American preclusion law is so
strong that it applies a presumption of full faith and credit to foreign-
country judgments too.33 This calls into question any claimed structural lim-
it on the scope of injunctive relief. Instead, these are context-specific ques-
tions that require deep thinking about law and policy.
26. I expand on these requirements as well as Parklane’s other exceptions infra Part III.
27 . See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing for class actions when “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole”). Critics of national injunctions frequently argue that nonparty protection is inappro-
priate because the plaintiffs could have sought a national class action instead. See supra note 1
(collecting sources).
28. Impediments to class-wide relief include rules on class certification, standing, per-
sonal jurisdiction, and more. See infra Section III.C. So even if class certification under Rule 23
seems like an alternative to national injunctions, it may not be one in practice.
29. The uncertainty of Parklane’s inquiry will incentivize plaintiffs to pursue interven-
tion or class certification when possible, without punishing those nonparties who are unable to
the join the case. Meanwhile, federal-government defendants knowing Parklane’s rejection of
wait-and-see plaintiffs will have an incentive to make sure that potentially affected persons are
aware of the litigation and given procedural opportunities to become parties to it.
30. For a discussion of the intriguing (and related) connections between nonmutual
preclusion and standing, see James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio
Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493, 1528–31, 1547–54 (2017).
31 . See, e .g ., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2426 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Morley, supra note 1, at 621–22.
32 . See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012)
(full faith and credit statute).
33 . See, e .g ., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181–82 (1895).
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The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides back-
ground and history on national injunctions and the law of preclusion. As
noted above, critics of national injunctions see the law of preclusion as an
argument against national injunctions. Part II shows that the history of pre-
clusion undercuts critics of national injunctions by calling into question
their historical claim. This Part thus contributes to current debates about na-
tional injunctions, which are even more pressing as the Supreme Court
seems poised to take up this issue with history in mind.
A better use of the connection between national injunctions and preclu-
sion is as an opportunity to rethink the exceptional treatment provided to
the federal government in United States v . Mendoza.34 Part III explains that
Mendoza was wrong when it was decided and that recent developments
make it look even worse. Part IV then further develops the relationship be-
tween preclusion and national injunctions. Were the Court (or Congress) to
overrule Mendoza, the availability of nonmutual preclusion would decrease
the pressure to issue national injunctions. If Mendoza remained good law,
the connection between preclusion and injunctions would still provide a
template for a more restrained use of national injunctions. Not insignificant-
ly, this approach leaves issues of preclusion and remedial scope to Congress
in the first instance—something that cannot be said for arguments, such as
the Justice Department’s, that resonate in Article III.35
In sum, scholars have been right to note the connection between non-
mutual preclusion and national injunctions. But rather than allowing an un-
justified exception to preclusion to distort the law of equitable relief, we
should take the opportunity to reform the law of preclusion, at which point
the “problem” of national injunctions becomes less severe and more easily
resolved.
I. BACKGROUND
Both sides of the national-injunctions debate acknowledge that there is a
relationship between the law governing national injunctions and the law of
preclusion.36 I have no quarrel with that aspect of the conventional wisdom,
but observing the relationship does not tell us what to make of it.
34. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
35 . See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 9–15, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17–
2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug 10, 2018), 2018 WL 3533168; OFFICE OF THEATTORNEY
GEN., LITIGATION GUIDELINES FOR CASES PRESENTING THE POSSIBILITY OF NATIONWIDE
INJUNCTIONS 1–3 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1093881/download
[https://perma.cc/6U5D-FPFR].
36 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources). In addition, the Mendoza-injunction connec-
tion was made by at least three briefs in the Travel Ban case. Brief for the Petitioners at 75–76,
Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens United et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 33–35, Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund in Support of Petitioners at 34–35, Trump v .
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965).
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To begin that task, this Part reviews the histories of national injunctions
and nonmutual preclusion. These strikingly parallel histories set the stage for
the historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented arguments to come.
A. National Injunctions
The injunctions that are the subject of this Article have gone by many
names,37 but the key feature is that they “prohibited or purported to prohibit
enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, and policies not only
against the named plaintiffs, but against all persons everywhere who might
be subject to enforcement of those laws.”38 In 2017, Professor Samuel Bray
offered a leading (though contested) account of the history of these so-called
national injunctions.39 Justice Thomas later relied heavily on this history to
frame his opposition to national injunctions.40 This Section briefly reviews
that history.
Professor Bray’s history is roughly divided into three periods. First, Bray
identifies a pre-history of national injunctions that runs up through the
middle of the twentieth century, during which time the scope of injunctions
was limited to parties.41 Bray explains: “There is an easy, uncomplicated an-
swer to the question whether the national injunction is traceable to tradi-
tional equity: no. . . . Through the middle of the twentieth century, there do
not appear to have been any national injunctions.”42 Second, federal courts
dipped their toes into the water of national injunctions in the 1960s and
1970s, but national injunctions remained few and far between in this peri-
37 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources). The title of this Article is not an endorsement
of the label “national,” and indeed I do not think any of the listed descriptors perfectly captures
the concept.
38 . See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 338. For a discussion of the related concept of ex-
traterritorial state injunctions, see generally Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity
Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747 (1998).
39 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 424–45.
40 . See Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thom-
as repeatedly cited Bray, and even where he did not, their histories are parallel. See id .
41 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 428. Bray acknowledges but distinguishes “bill[s] of peace,”
which he characterizes as “proto-class action[s].” Id . at 426. As noted below, even under Bray’s
conception, it is more accurate to say that injunctions were limited to parties and privies, see
infra Section II.A, though that distinction is not relevant to Bray’s discussion at this point.
I should also note that the success of Bray’s (and Justice Thomas’s) attempt to distinguish
bills of peace is significant for their argument. Amanda Frost, for one, is not convinced. See
Frost, supra note 1, at 1081 n.77. These issues are also explored in more detail in an amicus
brief in the sanctuary cities litigation on behalf of this author (among others). See Brief of Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, City of Chicago v. Barr, No. 18-
2885 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018).
42. Bray, supra note 1, at 425, 437 (second emphasis added). Bray adds: “They seem to
have been rejected as unthinkable as late as Frothingham v . Mellon [262 U.S. 447 (1923)] and to
have been conspicuously absent as late as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co . v . Sawyer [343 U.S.
579 (1952)].” Id . at 428.
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od.43 Third, and seemingly out of nowhere, national injunctions rose to
prominence: “By the 1980s and 1990s, to some judges they were an ordinary
part of the remedial arsenal of the federal courts.”44
The Obama and Trump Administrations have been “peak” national in-
junction. National injunctions have been sought or issued against President
Trump’s Travel Bans;45 against the operation of Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) and against the
rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”);46 against
President Obama’s transgender bathroom policy and against President
Trump’s transgender military ban;47 and against Obama Administration en-
vironmental policies and against Trump (and Bush) Administration at-
tempts to rescind environmental policies.48 Academics have written
countless articles.49 Congress has held hearings50 and a bill has been pro-
posed.51 It is only a matter of time before John Oliver gets wind of the is-
sue.52
Critics have raised a series of objections to national injunctions.53 Most
importantly, the availability of national injunctions seems unfair to defend-
ants because it encourages forum shopping and because its effects are
asymmetric.54 National injunctions encourage forum shopping by permit-
ting plaintiffs to sue in any court for national relief.55 It is no surprise, there-
fore, that public-law plaintiffs routinely sued Obama in Texas and Trump in
43 . See id . at 437–44.
44 . Id . at 428. Bray traces the rise of national injunctions to the structure of the federal
courts and to a change in the way that judges conceived of equitable relief. Id . at 445–57.
45 . E .g ., Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 672 (9th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d
741, 755–56 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th
Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
46 . E .g ., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally di-
vided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
47 . E .g ., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176–77 (D.D.C. 2017); Texas v. United
States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
48 . E .g ., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 100
(2d Cir. 2018); In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 805–06 (6th Cir. 2015); Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly,
376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
49 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources).
50 . See, e .g ., The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing
Before the Subcomm . on Courts, Intellectual Prop . & the Internet of the H . Comm . on the Judici-
ary, 115th Cong. (2017).
51. Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018).
52. If he is willing to cover special purpose districts, sovereign debt, and flood insur-
ance, surely civil procedure is coming soon.
53 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources).
54 . SeeWasserman, supra note 1, at 363.
55 . See, e .g ., id . at 363–64.
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the Ninth Circuit.56 Compounding this effect, national injunctions are also
asymmetric. Even if plaintiffs’ first-choice forum denied an injunction, other
potential plaintiffs could keep shopping until a court issued one.57 These po-
tential plaintiffs could sit on the sidelines during the first case, and wait and
see if they needed to file a second (or third or n-th) suit after the first suit
lost. Thus, the federal government must win every case to defeat a proposed
national injunction, while plaintiffs only need to win once to obtain national
relief.58 Critics have also argued that national injunctions limit percolation,
risk inconsistency, exceed Article III, complicate the contempt remedy, and
(as noted above) conflict with the history of equity and the spirit of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v . Mendoza.59 Though, again, forum
shopping and asymmetry have been central to the critique.
B. Nonmutual Preclusion
To a student of civil procedure, the aforementioned concerns with fo-
rum shopping and asymmetry will sound familiar: they are exactly the ar-
guments made in favor of mutuality in preclusion. But those arguments lost,
at least for everyone but the federal government. This Section briefly retells
the story of the rise of nonmutual preclusion that paralleled the rise of the
national injunction.
The focus of this Section is the doctrine of issue preclusion.60 The Sec-
ond Restatement of Judgments defines issue preclusion as follows: “When an
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determi-
nation is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on
the same or a different claim.”61 In other words, once a court resolves an is-
sue against a party, that finding will be binding in future cases between the
parties. Issue preclusion also contains a series of exceptions,62 some of which
I take up below.63
56 . See, e .g ., id . at 363.
57 . See, e .g ., id . at 363–64.
58 . Id .; see also Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v . Trump: The Puzzle of
Public Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 917 (2018) (exploring this phe-
nomenon and its relationship to multidistrict litigation (MDL)); Alex Botoman, Note, Divi-
sional Judge-Shopping, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Winter 2018, at 297, 300–08 (speculating
that the state of Texas selected particular divisions of federal districts in order to secure its pre-
ferred judges in suits against the U.S. government).
59. 464 U.S. 154 (1984); see supra note 1 (collecting sources). I take up the Mendoza is-
sue below.
60. Nonmutuality may apply to claim preclusion as well, but that is less relevant for my
analysis. See, e .g ., 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4464.1 (3d ed. 2017); Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109 HARV. L. REV. 792
(1996).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
62 . Id . § 28.
63 . See infra Section II.A.
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Historically, issue preclusion typically applied between parties.64 If I suc-
cessfully sued AT&T for deceptive advertising, the finding that a particular
advertisement was deceptive would be binding between AT&T and me. But
if you sued AT&T about the same ad, you could not invoke the prior judg-
ment. This feature of preclusion is called “mutuality.”65 A finding in favor of
AT&T from my suit would not be binding against you (because you did not
have your day in court), so mutuality says that you also should not be able to
get the benefit of any finding against AT&T from my earlier suit. The major
exception to party-based preclusion was for “privies,” those with a sufficient-
ly strong legal relationship to a party such that it would not be unfair to bind
them even if they were not formally parties to the prior judgment.66 This
doctrine was applied against the federal government as well.67 Yet even for
these quasi-parties, the law of preclusion usually maintained its requirement
of mutuality—binding privies only to the extent that it protected them.68
Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, cracks began to appear
in the bedrock of mutuality.69 An important development was a 1942 deci-
sion by the California Supreme Court. In Bernhard v . Bank of America,70 Jus-
tice Traynor approved the use of nonmutual issue preclusion by defendants.
Specifically, Bernhard permitted a defendant to use a finding from a prior
lawsuit in which it was not a party against a plaintiff that was a party to the
prior suit.71
64 . See, e .g ., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4463.
65 . Id .
66 . Id .
67 . See United States v. Des Moines Valley R.R. Co., 84 F. 40, 42–43 (8th Cir. 1897)
(permitting nonparty preclusion against the federal government based on a prior adjudication
involving a landowner because, in the new suit, the United States was only a nominal party
representing the interest of the same landowner); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 899–
900 (2008) (characterizing Des Moines Valley as applying (to the United States) the principle
that “[a] party may not use a representative or agent to relitigate an adverse judgment”); Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 619–20 (1926) (quoting Des Moines Val-
ley approvingly).
68 . See, e .g ., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (AM. LAW INST. 1942) (“A per-
son who is not a party but who is in privity with the parties in an action terminating in a valid
judgment is, to the extent stated in §§ 84–92, bound by and entitled to the benefits of the rules
of res judicata.”). The limited exceptions to this rule are not relevant here. See id . §§ 84–92.
69 . See, e .g ., B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967). See generally
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4464; Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option
Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1988).
Professor James Pfander’s work on Scottish procedure—and its connections to American
law—have surfaced earlier examples on nonparty preclusion in public litigation in the Scottish
Court of Session. See Pfander, supra note 30, at 1528–31. Pfander’s work suggests some intri-
guing connections among preclusion, standing, and injunctions, though they are beyond the
scope of this project.
70. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
71 . Id . at 895–96. In Bernhard, the California Supreme Court permitted Bank of Ameri-
ca to use issue preclusion against an administrator of a will who previously litigated (and lost)
the same issue in a suit against beneficiaries. Id . Preclusion, and nonmutual preclusion in par-
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Bernhard’s authorization of “defensive” nonmutual issue preclusion did
not necessarily extend to “offensive” nonmutual issue preclusion. Defensive
nonmutual issue preclusion allows a defendant to get the benefit of a prior
judgment against a former-party plaintiff. An offensive use would allow a
new plaintiff to file a lawsuit and assert “offensively” a prior judgment
against a former-party defendant.72 Offensive nonmutual preclusion thus
expanded the remedial effect of judgments to include nonparties bringing
future claims. The difference between defensive and offensive is more than
just a label. Indeed, a highly influential 1957 law review article by Brainerd
Currie argues that defensive and offensive uses of nonmutual issue preclu-
sion are categorically different, with the latter being much more objectiona-
ble than the former.73
Currie’s objections to offensive nonmutual preclusion boil down to two
related worries. First, he worries about plaintiffs selecting “a very inconven-
ient forum, where the opportunity to present an effective defense is subject
to maximum handicaps.”74 Second, he worries about the “multiple-claimant
anomaly.”75 Imagine, he writes, that there was a train crash injuring 50 peo-
ple. The claimants elected to sue the railroad successively. The defendant
won the first 25 cases. But if the 26th plaintiff won, then all remaining claim-
ants could use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the defendant.76
So, despite the fact that the railroad defendant won 25 out of 26 cases, half of
the plaintiffs would recover based on the lone plaintiff victory.77
Sound familiar? These arguments about forum shopping and asymmetry
are exactly the ones that critics of national injunctions have raised. But just
as courts have countenanced national injunctions, courts have countenanced
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion despite Currie’s protestations.
Although one can find earlier federal court cases on the issue,78 the ma-
jor development was the 1979 decision in Parklane Hosiery Co . v . Shore.79
Briefly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) successfully sued
ticular, have been linked to “finality and the preservation of resources.” Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 973–74 (1984).
72 . See, e .g ., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4464.
73. Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
74 . Id . at 288.
75 . Id . at 285–89.
76 . Id . at 285–86.
77 . Id .; see also Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REV. 612 (1978) (criticizing this result and its consequences for accura-
cy).
78 . SeeWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4464 (collecting cases).
79. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). For more about the Parklane litigation and its connection to the
perceived litigation crisis, see generally Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The “Litiga-
tion Crisis” and the Efficiency Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 405 (Kevin M. Cler-
mont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
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Parklane for issuing a false and misleading proxy statement.80 In a private
suit with similar allegations, stockholder plaintiffs sought the benefit of the
prior adjudication against Parklane.81 The Supreme Court dispensed with
the proposed offensive–defensive distinction: “We have concluded that the
preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is
not to preclude the use of offensive [nonmutual issue preclusion].”82
Instead, the Supreme Court concluded that a better approach would be
“to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when [nonmutual pre-
clusion] should be applied.”83 The Court went on to explain how it expected
the discretion to be exercised: “The general rule should be that in cases
where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . .
the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial
judge should not allow the use of offensive [nonmutual issue preclusion].”84
I should add that this discretion lives on today. In a set of 49 federal district
court cases from 2000 to 2017, judges exercised their discretion to decline
nonmutual preclusion in 43% of cases, including when plaintiffs could have
joined the prior action or when there were inconsistent prior judgments.85
Although these results may not be representative,86 it is fair to say that Park-
lane discretion is not a dead letter.
80 . Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324–25.
81 . Id . at 325.
82 . Id . at 331. The Court also was not troubled by the fact that the first proceeding was a
bench trial while in the second the defendant would have been entitled to a jury. Id . at 333–37
(finding no Seventh Amendment problem with offensive nonmutual issue preclusion from an
equitable proceeding to a legal one). More generally, the Supreme Court has explained that
preclusion principles are the same whether the first judgment is based in law or equity. Baker v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998) (“The Court has never placed equity decrees out-
side the full faith and credit domain. . . . We see no reason why the preclusive effects of an ad-
judication on parties and those ‘in privity’ with them, i .e ., claim preclusion and issue
preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel), should differ depending solely upon the type
of relief sought in a civil action.” (footnote omitted)).
83 . Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
84 . Id .
85. See, e .g ., T.G. v. Remington Arms Co., No. 13–CV–0033–CVE–PJC, 2014 WL
1310285, at *8–9 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2014) (discussing inconsistent prior judgments); Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. Int’l Media Films, Inc., No. CV 11-09112 SJO (AJWx), 2012 WL
12884852, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (discussing “wait and see” plaintiffs); see also, e .g ., Petit
v. City of Chicago, No. 90 C 4984, 2001 WL 914457, at *6–9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2001) (offering
a thoughtful discussion of Parklane discretion). To identify these cases, I used Westlaw’s feder-
al court database to search for federal district court decisions from 2000 to 2017 in which
“nonmutual!” appeared in the same paragraph as “Parklane.” I then reviewed all 92 results,
which produced 49 cases in which the court decided whether to invoke nonmutual preclusion.
In 21 cases (43%), the court declined to extend nonmutual preclusion to some or all issues
identified by the invoking party.
86. For example, this search only identified written opinions that expressly considered
Parklane. It is quite possible that in other cases a court invoked nonmutual preclusion without
discussion. And, of course, parties make strategic decisions about when to assert (and contest)
nonmutual preclusion in the first place. But again, the minimal claim here is that courts at
times exercise Parklane discretion.
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In any event, after Parklane nonmutual preclusion became the dominant
approach, including under federal law.87 But not for all parties, it turns out.
Traditionally, the same preclusion doctrine applied to government and non-
government parties in civil cases.88 And even today, the federal government
may assert nonmutual issue preclusion against private parties.89 But a differ-
ence of opinion developed about whether offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion should be available against the government. Federal court decisions
went both ways.90
In 1984, the Supreme Court weighed in. The case involved a statute that
permitted the naturalization of Filipinos serving in the U.S. military during
World War II.91 The problem was that the United States did not maintain a
representative in the Philippines with the authority to naturalize service
members, and a federal court later held that this denied due process to a
group of Filipino veterans seeking U.S. citizenship.92 A series of follow-on
lawsuits sought the benefit of this finding against the United States in order
to support other veterans’ claims for naturalization.93 These cases included
one filed by a doctor in his seventies named Sergio Mendoza.94
In an opinion authored by then-Justice William Rehnquist, a dissenter
from Parklane, the Supreme Court held that offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion was not available against the federal government.95 The Court of-
fered a number of reasons for its decision, including that preclusion would
thwart the development of the law and that the government was a unique lit-
igant necessitating different protections.96 I will take up the reasoning below,
but for the moment, the take-home message is that U.S. courts adopted a de-
87 . SeeWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4464.
88. Criminal law—and double jeopardy—would be a different matter. See, e .g ., id .
89 . See, e .g ., Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 378 F.3d 1132, 1138
(10th Cir. 2004).
90 . See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4465.4 (collecting cases). Cases that granted
preclusion against the government included Nevada Power Co . v . Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 932 &
n.17 (10th Cir. 1983); Starker v . United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1348–50 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson
v . United States, 576 F.2d 606, 613–15 (5th Cir. 1978); Speaker Sortation Systems v . United
States Postal Service, 568 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1978); andWilliams v . Schweiker, 541 F. Supp. 1360,
1365 (E.D. Mo. 1982). Cases that denied preclusion to the government included Doran v . Sa-
lem Inn, Inc ., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Victory Highway Village, Inc . v . Weaver, 634 F.2d 1099,
1101 (8th Cir. 1980); Divine v . Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Consumer Product
Safety Commission v . Anaconda Co ., 445 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1977); and United States v . Ana-
conda Co ., 445 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1977).
91. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 156 (1984).
92 . In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 940–42 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
93 . See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 155–57.
94 . Id .; Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1322–25 (9th Cir. 1982).
95 . Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 164.
96 . See id . at 159–63.
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fault rule that permitted offensive nonmutual issue preclusion—but that de-
fault rule did not apply to federal-government defendants.97
II. RETELLING THENATIONAL INJUNCTIONSHISTORY
The history of preclusion offers a new vantage on the received history of
national injunctions. It is this new vantage, I contend, that scholars of na-
tional injunctions have not appreciated. And it is this new vantage, I further
contend, that can serve as a useful corrective for judges and legislators con-
templating changes to national-injunctions law.98
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court unwittingly presaged the connec-
tion between preclusion and national injunctions. “For claim and issue pre-
clusion (res judicata) purposes,” the Court explained, “the judgment of the
rendering State gains nationwide force.”99 This Part makes that connection
clear.
A. Early History
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Bray’s early takedown of national in-
junctions was the absence of national injunctions for most of the history of
equity (other than the “bill of peace”).100 Critics of national injunctions use
this history to argue that modern judges have stepped beyond their historic
role—Attorney General Jeff Sessions labeled these judges with the scarlet-A
(“activist”).101
97. The Mendoza opinion seemingly circumscribed its holding to “issues such as those
involved in this case,” id . at 162, but courts have generally extended it to all attempted uses of
Parklane against federal-government defendants. See Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Sullivan, 916
F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting the “the well-established rule that nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel cannot be asserted against the government” (footnote omitted)); Am. Fed’n
of Gov’t Emps., Council 214 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 835 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“[Mendoza] held that the rules governing offensive issue preclusion between private
litigants do not apply when the government is a party. Collateral estoppel will apply against the
government only if mutuality of parties exists.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4465.4 (not-
ing that the relatively few exceptions have relied on law of the case or law of the circuit princi-
ples, or on the government’s pursuit of “essentially private interests”). Indeed, some courts
have extended Mendoza to cover defensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the federal gov-
ernment as well. See Kanter v. Comm’r, 590 F.3d 410, 419–20 (7th Cir. 2009).
98 . See, e .g ., supra note 19 (citing pending cases); supra note 50 (citing congressional
hearing).
99. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
100 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 425–27. The significance of bills of peace is important to
the national-injunctions debate, see supra note 41, though it is not central to the argument
here.
101 . See Jeff Sessions, Nationwide Injunctions Are a Threat to Our Constitutional Order,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/nationwide-
injunctions-stop-elected-branches-enforcing-law [https://perma.cc/4JBJ-9M3E].
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This historical argument has doctrinal consequences too. Because the
equitable powers of federal courts are to be traced to the history of equity,102
the lack of historical precedents for national injunctions calls into question
the authority of federal courts. Indeed, Bray suggested that translating this
history to the modern context “requires” a rule forbidding injunctions
against federal defendants that protect nonparties.103 Justice Thomas, pick-
ing up this thread, argued that the federal courts’ authority to grant equitable
relief “must comply with longstanding principles of equity that predate this
country’s founding.”104 He then added: “[National] injunctions do not seem
to comply with those principles.”105
The history of preclusion suggests an alternative reading. During the
long era of mutuality, parties to a lawsuit could receive the direct benefits of
preclusion. Nonparties typically could not repair to court and invoke the
prior adjudication.106 Symmetrically, during the long era of party-protecting
injunctions, typically only parties to a lawsuit could receive the direct bene-
fits of injunctive relief.107 Both doctrines also made room for privies. Non-
parties in privity with parties were able to obtain the advantages (and
disadvantages) of preclusion.108 During the same period, and seemingly
unacknowledged by national-injunction critics,109 privies may have been able
to obtain the advantages (and disadvantages) of injunctive relief.110 So far, so
good.
102 . See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–
29 (1999). But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limi-
tations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1314–15
(2000) (criticizing the decision); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 234–55 (2003) (same). Justice Thomas made this
point as well. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2426 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Note
also that Grupo Mexicano’s principle derives from jurisdictional statutes, Grupo Mexicano, 527
U.S. at 318, whereas some national-injunction critics have looked to Article III. See, e .g .,
OFFICE OF THEATTORNEYGEN., supra note 35 (citing DOJ’s position).
103 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 421.
104 . Trump v . Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2426 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
105 . Id .
106 . See supra Section I.B.
107 . See supra Section I.A.
108 . See supra Section I.B.
109 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources). Indeed, the first bill proposed in Congress
seemingly prohibits federal courts from enjoining privies. See Injunctive Authority Clarifica-
tion Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018) (allowing injunctions to protect nonpar-
ties only if they are “represented by a party acting in a representative capacity pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
110. Injunctions traditionally bound privies. See, e .g ., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 9, 14 (1945) (describing “the common-law doctrine that a decree of injunction not only
binds the parties defendant but also those identified with them in interest, in ‘privity’ with
them, represented by them or subject to their control”); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2956 (3d ed. 2013); see also Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of
the Bahá'ís of the U.S. Under the Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of
the Bahá'ís of the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 854 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting connection between in-
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But the rise of nonmutual preclusion upset the background principle
about who is entitled to the benefits of a prior judgment. Since the middle of
the twentieth century, nonparties might be able to invoke prior adjudica-
tions, including offensively, in subsequent cases.111 This revolution in preclu-
sion paralleled the revolution in national injunctions.112 The timing is also
highly conspicuous. The green shoots of national injunctions developed in
the 1960s and 1970s, and they bloomed in the 1980s and 1990s.113 The Su-
preme Court formally endorsed offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in
1979.114
This parallelism is more than just an amusing coincidence. One inter-
pretation of the received history of national injunctions is that courts would
not grant injunctive relief any broader than the preclusive effect of their
judgments.115 Or to put it another way, only those who could obtain the ben-
efits of preclusion were candidates to be protected by an injunction.
junction and preclusion privity). But see Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to In-
junctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1975) (identifying limits to this principle).
Privies also could be protected by injunctions. For example, Justice Thomas and Bray re-
lied on Scott v . Donald, 165 U.S. 107 (1897), for the proposition that injunctions against gov-
ernment defendants (here, South Carolina government defendants) should only protect
plaintiffs. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2428 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Bray,
supra note 1, at 429. In turn, Scott relied on Cutting v . Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 1079 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1865) (No. 3519), which rejected a bill of peace where the parties shared only a common inter-
est in the question involved—which does not qualify as a “unity or joinder of interest” neces-
sary for a bill of peace. Id . at 1080. But Cutting implied that this inquiry was necessary only
when there “not be any privity between the numerous parties.” Id .
Indeed, privity expanded the scope of injunctive relief against government defendants
too. Less than a decade after Scott, the Supreme Court heard another case filed against South
Carolina government defendants. In Gunter v . Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co ., the railroad
sued various state and municipal defendants seeking an injunction against the collection of
taxes. 200 U.S. 273, 281–82 (1906). The railroad relied on a previous injunction issued against
defendants in a case brought by its predecessor in interest, Pegues. Id . at 279–80 (citing
Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244 (1872)). The Supreme Court began its analysis:
“First. We at once treat as undoubted the right of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to
the benefits of the decree in the Pegues case, since it is conceded in the argument at bar that
that company, as the successor to the rights of Pegues, is entitled to the protection of the origi-
nal decree rendered in his favor.” Id . at 283. This is consistent with prevailing views of privity
at the time. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1942); see also Wil-
son v. Alexander, 276 F. 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1921) (characterizing Atlantic Coast and Pegues as
in privity).
Privies also may sue for civil contempt, see E.H. Schopler, Annotation,Who May Institute
Civil Contempt Proceedings, 61 A.L.R.2d 1083, § 4(c) (1958), and may enforce injunctions
against former parties, see Atl . Coast, 200 U.S. 273; see also Ahearn ex rel . NLRB v. Int’l Long-
shore & Warehouse Union, Locals 21 & 4, 721 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing
some circumstances in which contempt sanctions may be awarded to non-parties).
111 . See supra Section I.B.
112 . See supra Section I.A.
113 . See Bray, supra note 1, at 437–45; see also supra Section I.A.
114 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see also supra Section I.B.
115. Indeed, a nonparty from the first suit may seek an injunction enjoining a former
party (or privy) from relitigating an issue that should be nonmutually precluded. See WRIGHT
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So, if we view the history of injunctions as symmetrical with the history
of preclusion, then critics’ invocations of the early history of national injunc-
tions are inapposite. The world changed with the rise of nonmutual preclu-
sion such that earlier data are not conclusive. Or, when Bray says that the
early history must be “translated” to the modern era,116 that translation also
must include an acknowledgement that nonparties are candidates for the
benefits of preclusion in ways they did not used to be.117 At a minimum, and
contra Justice Thomas, the history alone does not obviously rule out national
injunctions today.
B. Modern History
Nonmutual preclusion also has something to say about the modern his-
tory of national injunctions.
First, it may not be a coincidence that judges cottoned to national in-
junctions around the time that nonmutual preclusion was being acknowl-
edged.118 Perhaps the acceptance of nonmutual preclusion in cases such as
Parklane changed judges’ views about the acceptable effects of judgments on
nonparties.119 Parties themselves might also have been more inclined to ask
for nonparty-protecting injunctions once the notion of nonparty preclusion
ET AL., supra note 60, § 4405.1 nn.17–18 (collecting cases). For example, in Thomas v . Powell,
the D.C. Circuit approved an injunction sought by class counsel—not a party—against dissi-
dent plaintiffs’ attempt to litigate a separate professional negligence claim against the attorney
because those plaintiffs would be subject to nonmutual preclusion. 247 F.3d 260, 262–63 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); see also Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp. 2d 114, 124 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting the
injunction and collecting cases doing the same). Or, in Samuel C . Ennis & Co . v . Woodmar
Realty Co ., the Seventh Circuit approved of an injunction protecting parties and nonparties
against relitigation in state court, invoking nonmutual preclusion for the latter group. 542 F.2d
45 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1990)
(privy-protecting injunction). The decision in Smith v . Bayer Corp ., 564 U.S. 299 (2011), dis-
cussed further below, does not make this type of injunction improper. See WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 60, § 4464.1.
116. Bray, supra note 1, at 469.
117 . Parklane offers a lesson here as well. A second issue in Parklane was whether the
Seventh Amendment should protect a defendant in a jury trial from the effects of nonmutual
preclusion from a non-jury judgment. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 333–37. The Supreme Court said
no. Id . at 336. Because the Seventh Amendment “preserves” the right to trial by jury, and pre-
clusion from equity to law was permitted at the time of the Founding, the Seventh Amendment
is no obstacle to preclusion. Id . at 333. But if you had been paying attention, you would notice
the sleight of hand—mutual preclusion was permitted at the time of the Founding, but not
nonmutual preclusion. Yet the Supreme Court found “no persuasive reason . . . why the mean-
ing of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties is pre-
sent.” Id . at 335. In other words, the translation of the Seventh Amendment to 1979 included
an acknowledgement that nonparties may receive greater benefits of preclusion than in 1791.
This does not mean that these doctrines share similar origins. While nonmutual preclusion has
been traced to the perceived litigation crisis, different circumstances have seemingly motivated
judges to issue national injunctions. See supra Part I.
118 . See supra Part I.
119 . See supra Part I.
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had set in. It is also possible that the same reasons led judges to conclude
that injunctions and preclusion should be expanded. Nothing here establish-
es a causal link between preclusion and injunctions, but at a minimum the
interconnection between these doctrines makes the rise of national injunc-
tions less anomalous.120
This history also has something to say about legal change. The switch to
nonmutual preclusion exemplified by Parklane and the exception for the
government acknowledged in Mendoza are not compelled by history or doc-
trine.121 Nor is there some deep structure of federal courts that confines their
judgments to their home jurisdictions.122 Instead, Parklane and Mendoza
were policy choices made by federal lawmakers123 motivated by views about
the right balance of efficiency and fairness.124
120. It is also possible that Mendoza’s special treatment of government defendants has
consequences for the willingness of judges to award national injunctions. Imagine a judge op-
erating in an environment of nonmutuality. This judge is used to her rulings affecting nonpar-
ties via nonmutual preclusion. But in walks a federal defendant exempted from Parklane’s
general rule. Critics of national injunctions suggest that this exemption should translate to an
exemption from national injunctions—but it is at least possible that a judge, seeing this exemp-
tion, might be more inclined to give a national injunction against a federal defendant in order
to remedy the unequal treatment of federal and nonfederal defendants. Cf . Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive
Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) (discussing the interrelationship among decisions about justi-
ciability, remedies, and merits); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibra-
tion, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (arguing that rights and remedies are tightly intertwined in
constitutional law). Such inclinations might be enhanced by recent changes in the way that
courts have handled aggregate litigation, meaning that courts may not have the option to con-
vert nonparties to parties through the class action mechanism. I have more to say about the law
of aggregate litigation below, but here the point is more explanatory—the rise of nonmutual
preclusion and the exemption of the federal government might help explain why we have more
national injunctions today.
121 . See supra Section I.B.
122. This is true even without nonmutuality, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and
Credit Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (full faith and credit statute), but it became perhaps
more obvious once nonmutual preclusion took hold. In this way, even before Parklane, critics
of national injunctions would have been wrong to claim a jurisdiction-based limit to the reach
of federal judgments. Cf . Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“A final judg-
ment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter
and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. For
claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in other words, the judgment of the render-
ing State gains nationwide force.” (footnote omitted)).
123. Both Parklane and Mendoza are federal common law decisions. See, e .g . United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). As such, they are susceptible to Supreme Court or
congressional revision. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (“[W]hen
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common
law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”); see also
infra Part IV (discussing institutional choice and preclusion law).
124 . See, e .g ., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (“To preclude par-
ties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects
their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial
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Indeed, this history reveals that many of the same policy considerations
are relevant to decisions about the scope of preclusion and the scope of in-
junctive relief. As mentioned above, the exact charges against national in-
junctions were leveled against nonmutual preclusion—and appeals to effi-
efficiency and fairness characterize defenses of both doctrines.125 This is not
to say that preclusion law must be perfectly symmetrical with the scope of
injunctions.126 But preclusion–injunction symmetry, as a rough guide, would
be consistent with the overlapping policy arguments that connect these is-
sues.127
In sum, contrary to the claim of critics, history does not so clearly re-
quire a hard-and-fast rule against national injunctions. Indeed, the history
might be read to call for injunctions to track preclusion, which today permits
substantial nonparty protection. The best reading, though, is that the history
neither requires nor prohibits national injunctions. Instead, this history gives
space for courts (and legislators) to assess the relevant policies that under-
gird the law of remedies and judgments.
III. OVERRULINGMENDOZA
So far this Article has explored the relationship between injunctions and
preclusion. This Part goes further, jumping off from that relationship to
propose a different sort of law reform: overruling United States v . Mendoza.
Earlier comments on national injunctions and preclusion show that nei-
ther history nor structure require overruling the Mendoza decision. Mendo-
za itself is a decision based on policy,128 and it is on this terrain that I
challenge its reasoning. This Part’s arguments could also be deployed by
those seeking to narrow Mendoza, but the course described here involves
overrulingMendoza and leaving open the option for Congress to later devel-
op preclusion exceptions where needed.
Importantly, nothing in this argument requires parallelism between
Mendoza and national injunctions. One could agree that Mendoza should be
overruled and then support either allowing or prohibiting national injunc-
tions.129 Instead, this Part takes advantage of the recent fervor around non-
resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.”).
125 . See supra Part I.
126. For one thing, at the time a court crafts equitable relief, it may be difficult to imagine
the exact contours of a judgment’s future preclusive effect. See, e .g ., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“A court conducting an action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment;
that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.”).
127. I take up this framework infra Section IV.B.
128 . See infra Section III.A. Though not addressing Mendoza specifically, Professor Res-
nik similarly characterized the Supreme Court’s preclusion precedents as reflecting “value
choices.” Resnik, supra note 71, at 972.
129. I discuss infra Part IV how these arrangements might work together. Estreicher and
Revesz similarly conclude that the law of nonmutual preclusion, though analytically similar, is
October 2019] National Injunctions and Preclusion 21
party protection to argue that the Supreme Court (or Congress) should over-
rule Mendoza regardless of the resolution of the national-injunctions debate.
The next Part takes up what this choice would mean for national injunc-
tions.130
A. MendozaWas Wrong
I turn first to the reasoning of Mendoza. After asserting that the gov-
ernment is not identical to a private litigant131—a point that does little to an-
swer the question at issue—the Supreme Court offered a series of arguments
for exempting the United States from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.
Notably, the Court’s arguments were not about history, structure, or the
Constitution. Instead, the Court offered six policy reasons to exempt the
government from nonmutual preclusion:
• First, the federal government is a party to a substantial number of
cases across the entire geography of the United States.132
• Second, government litigation frequently involves issues of sub-
stantial public importance that have consequences for many non-
parties.133
not dispositive of questions about agency nonacquiescence. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note
6, at 684–85.
130. This Part does not address the institutional question whether legislators or judges
are best positioned to define preclusion law. But this Part assumes that the policy-inflected
choices will not be constitutional rules and thus will be amenable to revision. See infra notes
265–267 and accompanying text. Nor does this Part address the relationship betweenMendoza
and Chevron. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that an agency interpretation may be enti-
tled to Chevron deference even if it contradicted prior circuit-court precedent. See Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–82 (2005). It is conceivable
that Congress or the Court might want to extend this rule to issue preclusion (ifMendoza were
overruled), though I suspect that existing requirements of and exceptions to issue preclusion
would likely negate preclusion for most of these cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 27–29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
131. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984). Because this section focuses on
the arguments for and against Mendoza, I quote from the Supreme Court extensively in the
following footnotes.
132.
We have long recognized that “the Government is not in a position identical to
that of a private litigant,” both because of the geographic breadth of Government litiga-
tion and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the issues the Government lit-
igates. It is not open to serious dispute that the Government is a party to a far greater
number of cases on a nationwide basis than even the most litigious private entity; in
1982, the United States was a party to more than 75,000 of the 206,193 filings in the
United States District Courts. In the same year, the United States was a party to just un-
der 30% of the civil cases appealed from the District Courts to the Court of Appeals.
Id . at 159–60 (citations omitted) (quoting INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973), and citing 1982
ANN. REP. DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. 98, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
msu.31293018513584 (on file with theMichigan Law Review)).
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• Third, nonmutual preclusion would impede the development of
the law through “percolation” in the lower courts, especially in
cases of public importance.134
• Fourth, applying nonmutual preclusion would require the solici-
tor general to change its policy concerning appeals and to appeal
every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing further re-
view.135
• Fifth, applying nonmutual preclusion would interfere with the
ability of different presidential administrations to take different
positions on the law.136
133.
Government litigation frequently involves legal questions of substantial public im-
portance; indeed, because the proscriptions of the United States Constitution are so
generally directed at Governmental action, many constitutional questions can arise only
in the context of litigation to which the Government is a party. Because of those facts
the government is more likely than any private party to be involved in lawsuits against
different parties which nonetheless involve the same legal issues.
Id . at 160.
134.
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such
cases would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by
freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Allowing only one
final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting
several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiora-
ri. Indeed, if nonmutual estoppel were routinely applied against the Government, this
Court would have to revise its practice of waiting for a conflict to develop before grant-
ing the government’s petitions for certiorari.
Id . (citations omitted).
135.
The Solicitor General’s policy for determining when to appeal an adverse decision
would also require substantial revision. . . . Unlike a private litigant who generally does
not forgo an appeal if he believes that he can prevail, the Solicitor General considers a
variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the Government and the crowded
dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal. The application of nonmutual es-
toppel against the government would force the Solicitor General to abandon those pru-
dential concerns and to appeal every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing
further review.
Id . at 160–61 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
136.
In addition to those institutional concerns traditionally considered by the Solicitor
General, the panoply of important public issues raised in governmental litigation may
quite properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing
positions with respect to the resolution of a particular issue. While the Executive Branch
must of course defer to the Judicial Branch for final resolution of questions of constitu-
tional law, the former nonetheless controls the progress of Government litigation
through the federal courts. It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of government
litigation in all its myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United
States district court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the
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• Sixth, the indeterminacy of Parklane’s approach would be unfair
to the government.137
For these policy arguments to be persuasive, they would need to offer
more than a broadside against Parklane generally and explain why the gov-
ernment deserves special treatment.138 In short, I am not convinced.139
We can quickly dispense with the concern that the solicitor general’s of-
fice would have to change its appeals policy—an argument that, on its own,
should move no one.140 In addition, the geographic spread of government
litigation is verging on non sequitur, and the quantity of cases does not ex-
plain why preclusion should or should not attach.141
We also can dispense with arguments that apply equally to all uses of
nonmutual preclusion. Concerns about incentivizing over-litigation,142 sacri-
court of appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy choices
whatever.
Id . at 161.
137.
The Court of Appeals did not endorse a routine application of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel against the government, because it recognized that the Government does
litigate issues of far-reaching national significance which in some cases, it concluded,
might warrant relitigation. But in this case it found no “record evidence” indicating that
there was a “crucial need” in the administration of the immigration laws for a redeter-
mination of the due process question decided in 68 Filipinos and presented again in this
case. The Court of Appeals did not make clear what sort of “record evidence” would
have satisfied it that there was a “crucial need” for redetermination of the question in
this case, but we pretermit further discussion of that approach; we believe that the
standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when relitigation of a le-
gal issue is to be permitted is so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to the
courts or to the Government. Such a standard leaves the Government at sea because it
cannot possibly anticipate, in determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision,
whether a court will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case. By the time a court
makes its subjective determination that an issue cannot be relitigated, the Government’s
appeal of the prior ruling of course would be untimely.
Id . at 162 (citation omitted).
138. Of course, if one felt that nonmutual preclusion were an outrage to justice, perhaps
paring it back unevenly (such as for federal defendants only) would be better than nothing. See
Email from Kevin M. Clermont to author (Mar. 27, 2018) (on file with author); see also
ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY,
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 184–88 (2001). This Article, though, presumes the continued exist-
ence of nonmutual preclusion.
139. I take the Court on its own terms, though of course there may have been other rea-
sons for its decisions. Cf . Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 618–19
(1985) (“[I]n the rare instances when the Court permits more procedural opportunities, the
‘winner’ is often the government, and particularly the United States. . . . [I]n United States v .
Mendoza, the Court created a special exception to the nonmutual collateral estoppel rule for
the federal government. Thus, the government may be permitted multiple chances to litigate
but the rest of us are not. The Court’s work in this area may be explained by hostility towards
certain categories of rights and to the individuals claiming them.” (footnotes omitted)).
140 . Contra Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159–60.
141 . Contra id . at 160–61.
142 . Contra id .
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ficing percolation,143 and fostering indeterminacy144 are common critiques of
nonmutual preclusion generally. And, of course, the Supreme Court has
been able to overcome these objections for all defendants but the federal
government.145
Deserving more attention is Mendoza’s claim that government cases in-
volve issues of public importance.146 First of all, this claim does not distin-
guish government litigation. Countless private defendants—think Big
Tobacco, Facebook, Wal-Mart, etc.—are involved in geographically dispar-
ate and sometimes publicly significant litigation.147 Indeed, the issues of pub-
lic importance litigated by the federal government are invariably issues
litigated with private parties who remain subject to nonmutual preclusion.
In Parklane itself, for example, nonparties were able to use nonmutual pre-
clusion against a private party based on a prior government suit.148 But after
Mendoza they would not have been able to use an adverse finding against the
federal government in the same circumstance.149 In other cases, the federal
government itself has invoked nonmutual preclusion against private par-
ties.150
Nor does Mendoza’s claim about public importance accurately describe
government litigation. Although the government litigates some cases of pub-
lic interest, not all government cases are important.151 It would be one thing
if the Supreme Court announced a special rule for cases of public im-
portance,152 and one might read certain exceptions to preclusion generally as
143 . Contra id . at 160.
144 . Contra id . at 162.
145 . See supra Section I.B (discussing Parklane).
146 . See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160. Indeed, much of the Court’s reasoning relies on an
implicit (and unjustified) assumption that government cases are of public importance and
nongovernment cases are not. This applies to issues labeled first, second, third, and sixth
above.
147. States, too, may be subjects of such litigation, and they are not automatically covered
byMendoza. SeeWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4465.4.
148 . See supra Section I.B (discussing Parklane).
149 . See supra Section I.B (discussingMendoza).
150 . See, e .g ., SEC. v. Resnick, 604 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D. Md. 2009); SEC. v. Grotto, No. 05
Civ. 5880(GEL), 2006 WL 3025878 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2006).
151. For example, the United States is routinely sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) after postal workers get into automobile accidents. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2012);
see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953) (“Uppermost in the collective mind of
Congress [when adopting the FTCA] were the ordinary common-law torts. Of these, the ex-
ample which is reiterated in the course of the repeated proposals for submitting the United
States to tort liability, is ‘negligence in the operation of vehicles.’ ”) (footnote omitted) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 3 (1940)).
152. Prior to Mendoza, the Second Circuit seemingly accepted that offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion might apply to the government but that it should be declined for “issues of
national concern.” Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 215 (2d Cir. 1980).
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reflecting this concern.153 But Mendoza seemingly applies to lower-profile
government litigation too.154
On this score, it is worth pausing on what government litigation looks
like. In the Mendoza opinion, Justice Rehnquist attempted to show the
unique status of the federal government by relying on a report from the Ad-
ministrative Office of U.S. Courts for the fact that “in 1982, the United States
was a party to more than 75,000 of the 206,193 filings in the United States
District Courts.”155 This statement is true but incomplete. The same report
showed that the U.S. government was almost twice as likely to be a plaintiff
as a defendant in federal court,156 and that almost 30,000 of those cases in-
volved the United States seeking to recover defaulted student loans and
overpaid veterans’ benefits.157 Today, the United States is party to 40% fewer
district-court cases than in 1986, comprising less than 16% of district-court
dockets.158 The subject matter of these suits is highly varied, with the vast
majority being prisoner petitions and social security appeals.159 While cer-
tainly some of these cases are of public importance, they do not seem to
make the federal government sound so special that it deserves a blanket ex-
153. I say more about these exceptions below. See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying
text.
154. Although theMendoza opinion described its holding as applicable to “issues such as
those involved in this case,” United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984), courts have
generally applied its holding to all federal litigation, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60,
§ 4465.4. Prior to Mendoza, some courts limited nonmutual preclusion in government litiga-
tion to “narrow, fact-bound issues that will not jeopardize any of the public interests described
by the Court.” Id . This Article’s call to overrule Mendoza, in the first instance, would sweep
beyond this limit, subject to the general law of preclusion. As mentioned below, Congress
could pull back further on preclusion as it sees fit.
155 . Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159–60.
156. 1982 ANN. REP. DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. 4, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/
msu.31293018513584 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Note, too, that at times courts
have been more willing to apply nonmutual preclusion to former plaintiffs rather than former
defendants, because former plaintiffs chose when to sue, whom to sue, and where to sue. See,
e .g ., RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 854–55
(12th ed. 2017).
157. 1982 ANN. REP. DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 156, at 92, 101. The
United States was also a party to thousands of cases in each of torts, contracts, employment,
and real property. Id . at 99.
158 . See Table C-3: U .S . District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and
District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2018, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c3_0930.2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E93J-AYW3].
Not included in these figures are immigration appeals, for which review proceeds in the
courts of appeals. In 2016, the government won 89% of immigration appeals. See Jonah B. Gel-
bach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 96
TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1112 n.78 (2018).
159 . See Table C-3, supra note 158. See generally Gelbach & Marcus, supra note 158 (dis-
cussing social security appeals). Note also that prisoner petitions are subject to various special
rules that make success quite challenging. See, e .g ., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) (federal habeas); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. 2018) (Prison Litigation Reform Act).
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ception from the normal rules of preclusion. And presumably many of these
cases turn on case-specific determinations for which nonmutual preclusion
would not be relevant.160
Even if Mendoza were correct that government litigation involved issues
of public importance, it is not obvious why this should countenance against
nonmutual preclusion. Issues of public importance are seemingly more like-
ly to get Supreme Court review, so erroneous lower-court decisions can be
quickly resolved.161 It is also not clear why we should be troubled if the gov-
ernment invested a few more litigation resources in cases that might affect
large groups of potential litigants.162 This might be exactly what the Justice
Department should be doing.
Mendoza’s most compelling argument to exempt the federal govern-
ment from nonmutual preclusion is the issue of changing administrations.163
Although private defendants may also change leadership, the democratic
process is qualitatively different on this dimension. In particular, it is possi-
ble that the Court was worried about one administration “locking in” future
administrations through preclusion.164
160 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (limiting
issue preclusion to situations in which cases address the same issue).
161. This critique also applies to the national-injunction critics: it seems somewhat odd
to point to examples such as the Travel Ban litigation as national-injunction problems when
those cases are (relatively) quickly resolved by the Supreme Court. See infra Part IV (applying
this argument to national injunctions). Those cases, too, are poor illustrations of the need for
percolation. Infra Part IV.
162 . See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160–61 (1984). These resources might
reflect more investment in the trial court or a greater willingness to appeal.
163 . Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
164. Analogous discussions arise in the context of structural injunctions and consent de-
crees. See, e .g ., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448–49 (2009) (“[T]he dynamics of institutional
reform litigation differ from those of other cases. Scholars have noted that public officials
sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is
required by federal law. Injunctions of this sort bind state and local officials to the policy pref-
erences of their predecessors and may thereby ‘improperly deprive future officials of their des-
ignated legislative and executive powers.’ States and localities ‘depen[d] upon successor
officials, both appointed and elected, to bring new insights and solutions to problems of allo-
cating revenues and resources.’ Where ‘state and local officials . . . inherit overbroad or outdat-
ed consent decrees that limit their ability [to] respond to the priorities and concerns of their
constituents,’ they are constrained in their ability to fulfill their duties as democratically elected
officials.” (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004), then quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004),
and then quoting Brief on Behalf of the Am. Legislative Exch. Council & Certain Individual
State Legislators as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433
(2009) (No. 08-294))); Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to
Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 298 (“I contend that a nar-
row but important class of consent decrees, if judicially enforced, would violate the structural
provisions of the Constitution by denying future executive officials the policymaking authority
vested in them by the Constitution and laws. These consent decrees circumvent democratic
change by precluding subsequent Presidents from changing policies set, through consent de-
cree, by a previous Administration (or, for that matter, by preventing a single President from
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Upon further scrutiny, this change-in-administrations concern is over-
blown. For one thing, there is no inviolable principle against “locking in” the
federal government.165 Cross-administration lock-in can arise from contract,
including from contract-like devices such as plea bargains and nonprosecu-
tion agreements.166 Perhaps more importantly, it is beyond doubt that the
federal government may be locked in by judgments. The Mendoza opinion
worried about nonmutual preclusion locking in future administrations, but
the opinion readily conceded that mutual preclusion may attach to the fed-
eral government.167 And continuing the preclusion–injunctions parallel from
above, there is no doubt that future administrations may be bound by in-
junctions in the normal course.168
Not only do we tolerate other forms of lock-in, but the law of preclusion
also provides various outs that help avoid bad outcomes. First, as noted
above, Parklane is not a mandatory rule.169 Parklane gives courts discretion
changing his mind).”). See generally Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435 (2013).
165. I would also submit that, to the extent there is a “lock-in” problem, it does not attach
differently to the federal government than it would to states and localities, yet they are not giv-
en special treatment underMendoza.
166 . See, e .g ., United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835–36 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“Nonprosecution agreements, like plea bargains, are contractual in nature, and are therefore
interpreted in accordance with general principles of contract law. Under these principles, if a
defendant lives up to his end of the bargain, the government is bound to perform its promises.”
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512–13 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining
when specific performance is the appropriate remedy against the government for breach of a
cooperation agreement). See generally Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of
Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prose-
cution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537 (2015).
167 . See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 163–64 (“Today in a companion case we hold that the
Government may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when
the parties to the two lawsuits are the same. . . . The application of an estoppel when the Gov-
ernment is litigating the same issue with the same party avoids the problem of freezing the de-
velopment of the law because the Government is still free to litigate that issue in the future with
some other party. And, where the parties are the same, estopping the Government spares a
party that has already prevailed once from having to relitigate—a function it would not serve in
the present circumstances.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); see also United States v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 168 (1984) (holding, on the same day as Mendoza, that “the
doctrine of mutual defensive [issue preclusion] is applicable against the Government to pre-
clude relitigation of the same issue already litigated against the same party in another case in-
volving virtually identical facts”).
168. The prominent critiques of nonparty-protecting injunctions do not raise objections
to party-protecting injunctions. See supra note 1 (including several sources objecting to non-
party-protecting injunctions); supra note 164 (discussing injunctions that bind the federal gov-
ernment across administrations). And this says nothing of political choices that functionally
lock in future administrations. Cf . David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron
and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administra-
tive State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1237–71 (2004) (exploring how the federal government politi-
cally locks states into federal programs).
169. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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with respect to nonmutual preclusion, and it advises courts to decline pre-
clusion when it would be “unfair.”170 Similarly, the Restatement’s version of
nonmutual issue preclusion may be avoided for issues of law or when
“[o]ther compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be
permitted to relitigate the issue.”171 For example, following a successful fed-
eral-government suit against tobacco companies, seven different courts used
their discretion to decline to give private parties the benefit of nonmutual
preclusion against the company defendants.172
Second, there are general exceptions to issue preclusion that might alle-
viate these concerns, which also seem to respond to the “public importance”
issue mentioned above. The Second Restatement of Judgments provides that
issue preclusion should not attach when, among other reasons, “[t]he issue is
one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unre-
lated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an
intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid in-
equitable administration of the laws.”173 These exceptions were endorsed by
the Supreme Court in cases involving the federal government. United States
v . Moser (and later Montana) explained that determinations of pure law are
not binding across unrelated proceedings.174 Sunnen (and later Montana as
170 . Id . Complaining about Parklane’s indeterminacy—as Mendoza does—falls into the
category of generalized grievances that are not specific to the government. See Mendoza, 464
U.S. at 161. And, of course, the Supreme Court wrote Parklane, and it could “rulify” Parklane if
it wanted to. Cf . Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805–06 (2005) (“Rather than embracing standards as the logi-
cal corollary to resisting rules, interpreters and enforcers have systematically resisted standards
almost as much as they have resisted rules, sharpening the soft edges of standards just as they
have rounded off the crisp corners of rules. Whether it be by importing rules from elsewhere,
or imposing rules of some sort on their own otherwise unconstrained decision-making, or fill-
ing decisional voids with three- and four-part tests, interpreters and enforcers of standards
have tried to convert those standards into rules to a surprising degree, surprising especially
because the effect of such action is to constrain the very choices that those interpreters and en-
forcers would otherwise have had . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(7)–(8) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
172 . See Shaffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 860 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995–96 (D. Ariz.
2012) (“Courts in six states (Massachusetts, Missouri, Maine, Minnesota, California, and New
York) handling tobacco litigation have been asked by various plaintiffs to use offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion to apply hundreds or thousands of the findings of fact from the DOJ
Case to establish liability in their respective cases. All of these courts have rejected these re-
quests and exercised their broad discretion not to allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
relating to the DOJ Case. Like these courts, this Court finds that using offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion to apply findings of fact from the DOJ Case to establish liability in this case is
inappropriate, and therefore exercises its broad discretion not to allow the use of the doctrine
in this case.” (citations omitted)).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2). The law of injunctions also
acknowledges the need for flexibility in light of changes in circumstances. See Rufo v. Inmates
of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383–93 (1992).
174. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1979); United States v. Moser, 266
U.S. 236, 242 (1924). So, a determination of law against the United States will not be binding in
later cases against the United States if the cases were sufficiently unrelated so that nonpreclu-
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well) found an exception to issue preclusion for legal issues when preclusion
might create unequal legal treatment.175 Both of these exceptions would be
useful to courts seeking to excuse a new administration from the preclusive
effects of judgments against prior administrations.
The Restatement further provides that issue preclusion should not at-
tach when:
There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue
(a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the
public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the ini-
tial action, (b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the
initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent ac-
tion, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the con-
duct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an
adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in
the initial action.176
Here, a change in administrations could be the “special circumstances” un-
der clause (c). Clause (a) protects the public interest, which also may be at
issue. Indeed, this option may be especially significant when changes in gov-
ernment policy are justified by appeals to the public interest—which, I would
submit, are the changes in policy most deserving of special treatment.177
In short, therefore, there is a well-developed system of exceptions to
preclusion (and to nonmutual preclusion) that would seem to meet all of the
Supreme Court’s concerns without reflexively resorting to a special rule ap-
plicable only when the government loses an issue.
B. Government Preclusion
The case for preclusion is well known, relying primarily on efficiency
and fairness. This Section will not rehash every detail of that case—nor
should it be read to endorse unqualifiedly any of these arguments. Instead,
the Section argues that the values of preclusion apply at least as strongly to
government litigants.
One classic justification for preclusion is that it avoids relitigation,
which is costly in terms of resources and also in terms of the risk of incon-
sistent adjudications.178 A major theme in modern civil procedure has been
the desire to bring together in a single proceeding all related claims and par-
ties—think liberal claim and party joinder, class actions, and the merger of
sion is more than just a second bite at the apple. Montana, 440 U.S. at 162–63; Moser, 266 U.S.
at 242.
175 . Montana, 440 U.S. at 158–62; Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5).
177. After all, the Supreme Court justified the governmental exception because the gov-
ernment is often involved in litigation of public concern. See supra note 146 and accompanying
text.
178. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4403.
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law and equity.179 The same logic applies to preclusion: the broader the pre-
clusion rule, the greater the incentives to litigate everything up front. For
high-profile cases destined for the Supreme Court, there seems to be even
less reason to wait.180
Preclusion also sounds in fairness.181 Preclusion protects winning parties
from having to relitigate their successful claims. While those resisting non-
mutual preclusion typically argue unfairness, it is not unfair to bind a de-
fendant who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue.182 It is one
thing if, through no fault of its own, a party did not litigate an issue to the
fullest. The law of issue preclusion generally has an exception in these
terms,183 and Parklane seemingly expands that exception in nonmutual situ-
ations.184 But if a defendant completely litigated an issue, why should we give
that defendant a second bite at the apple?185 Indeed, if a defendant knew that
179 . See generally Charles E. Clark & James WM. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure
(pt. 1) 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court
Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000).
180 . See supra note 161 and accompanying text (making this argument in opposition to
Mendoza).
181 . See generallyWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4403.
182. Some critics have argued that nonmutuality is unfair because the expected recovery
in nonmutual jurisdictions will deviate from the expected recovery of the original claim. See,
e .g ., Note, supra note 77. This is an argument about error costs, and it is true as far as it goes.
But, first, it fails to account for decision costs on the court or transaction costs on parties.
Those are costs too. Second, this argument assumes that the probability of winning is exoge-
nous. That is an erroneous assumption. The probability of victory depends, in part, on the ef-
fort expended. So a party facing nonmutual preclusion will invest more resources, thus
increasing its probability of winning. (This is the “over-litigation” concern marshaled by op-
ponents of nonmutuality, here marshaled as a reason to be less concerned about nonmutuali-
ty’s effects on accuracy.)
More generally, as Professor Bone explains: “[A] mutuality rule has potential benefits in
reducing litigation costs and preventing systematic trial and settlement error. At the same time,
mutuality creates substantial costs of its own by requiring the relitigation of issues that have
already been vigorously litigated and carefully determined in previous suits. It is not possible to
determine how the balance comes out without more empirical information and a more careful
analysis.” ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 253
(2003).
183 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
184 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29.
185. As the Court explained in Blonder-Tongue:
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to pre-
sent a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated
and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent
the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that
the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior
suit, the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—productive or
otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming that the issue was re-
solved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiff’s al-
location of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the
October 2019] National Injunctions and Preclusion 31
nonmutual preclusion could apply, then we should expect that defendant to
increase its litigation effort in light of the expanded stakes.186
Even if one were to quibble with the efficiency or fairness arguments in
favor of nonmutual preclusion, I would contend that these arguments offer
no reason to treat federal defendants differently. Arguments about efficiency
are difficult to parse,187 but government and nongovernment defendants
seemingly present the same tradeoffs in this space. Arguments about fairness
are also slippery,188 but it is difficult to understand why the governmental
status of the losing party (rather than the subject matter of the litigation or
the relationship between the parties) necessarily predicts the fairness of
nonmutual preclusion.
If anything, these values might point more strongly toward preclusion in
government cases. One might think that the awesome power of the govern-
ment189—not to mention its highly successful track record in federal litiga-
tion190 and its noted pattern of “nonacquiescence” to court decisions191—
would suggest being more cautious about giving the government an ad-
vantage over analogous private parties. Yet we protect the government from
supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or
‘a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a
worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.’ Although neither judges, the
parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of de-
termining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (quoting Kerotest
Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)).
186. It also might be true that courts—knowing that nonmutual preclusion is possible—
will avoid cavalier decisions that might have ripple effects across government programs. This
dynamic effect is speculative but plausible in at least some cases.
187 . See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 248–51 (1992).
188 . See id . at 256–64.
189. This is a power that seems even more awesome today than it did at the Founding.
Cf . Bray, supra note 1, at 445–57 (discussing government power and national injunctions).
190 . See, e .g ., Gelbach & Marcus, supra note 158, at 1112 n.78 (noting that, in 2016, the
government won 89% of immigration appeals); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L.
REV. 135, 171 (2010) (collecting studies finding that courts affirm between 58–76% of federal
agency decisions).
191 . E .g ., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 6, at 681 (“The selective refusal of administra-
tive agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the
courts of appeals—a practice commonly termed agency nonacquiescence—is not new in
American law. Over the past sixty years, many agencies have insisted, in varying degrees, on
the authority to pursue their policies, despite conflicting court decisions, until the Supreme
Court is prepared to issue a nationally binding resolution.”); Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hun-
dred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret
Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949 (2009) (surveying nonacquiescence); Wendy Wagner, Revisit-
ing the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1717, 1760–66 (2012) (reporting results of study showing EPA nonacquies-
cence). For more on the connection between this topic and nonacquiescence, see supra notes 6
& 129 and infra notes 243 & 265.
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nonmutual preclusion while allowing the government to invoke nonmutual
preclusion against other parties192 and while magnifying government victo-
ries by attaching nonmutual preclusion to them.193
We might also be more comfortable with a default rule permitting non-
mutual preclusion against the government because Congress might more
closely monitor these cases for systemic problems. It is not unreasonable to
expect that Congress is more attuned to issues that affect the federal gov-
ernment directly. For example, in their massive study of congressional over-
rides of Supreme Court decisions, Professors Christiansen and Eskridge
found that “the Executive Branch of the federal government is the biggest
player, and usually the big winner, in the override process.”194 So if Congress
concluded that the federal government, in certain circumstances, needed an
exemption from the normal rules of preclusion, it could so legislate.195 Con-
192. As mentioned above, the government has invoked nonmutual preclusion in its fa-
vor. See, e .g ., SEC v. Resnick, 604 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778–80 (D. Md. 2009); SEC v. Grotto, No. 05
Civ. 5880(GEL), 2006 WL 3025878, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2006). Indeed, the United States
has invoked nonmutual preclusion against other government defendants. See United States v.
Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., No. 08-5722RJB, 2010 WL 2698854, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. July 7,
2010) (using Parklane discretion to decline to apply nonmutual preclusion against the Wash-
ington State Department of Transportation as requested by the U.S. government).
193 . See, e .g ., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–32 (1979); id . at 355–56
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Su-
preme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1376 (2014).
The authors explained:
The legal position of the United States prevails in more than two-thirds of the
statutory cases decided by the Court, and the United States is usually a winner in the
override process as well: a large majority of the overrides adopt the policy or legal posi-
tion advanced by the United States during the congressional deliberation process. . . .
No group or institution enjoys the attention of Congress more than the Executive
Branch of the federal government: its officials testified, in depth, in a large majority of
overrides and supported the large majority of those overrides. The federal government
took an explicit position in just under three-quarters of the overrides, supporting the
override in 75% of those instances. . . . [T]he Department of Justice, the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Departments of State and of Defense, and the Federal
Trade Commission are among the most prominent agencies providing important con-
gressional testimony. . . . [T]heir position usually prevails. But even when it does not,
the Executive Branch’s position often affects the compromise ultimately reached.
Id . at 1376–78. For interesting results following congressional overrides, see generally Deborah
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Con-
gressional Overrides, 84 NOTREDAME L. REV. 511 (2009).
195 . Parklane and Mendoza are federal common law, which Congress can overrule. See
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1981). And Congress has been known to
legislate preclusion. See, e .g ., 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012) (discussing issue-preclusive effect of anti-
trust judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (full faith and credit statute); see also Kremer v.
Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (“In our system of jurisprudence the usual rule
is that merits of a legal claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction are not subject
to redetermination in another forum. Such a fundamental departure from traditional rules of
preclusion, enacted into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress.” (em-
phasis added)).
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gress also could fairly easily make changes to the administrative systems that
precede federal litigation with nonmutual preclusion in mind.196 And, again,
courts retain the flexibility to deny nonmutual preclusion on a case-by-case
basis when it would be unfair or otherwise problematic.197
C. Recent Developments
Finally, recent developments have made nonmutual preclusion against
the government even more important. Here, it is helpful to return to an ar-
gument raised in the context of national injunctions. In brief, a common re-
frain from opponents of national injunctions is that these remedies are un-
unnecessary because plaintiffs can always seek a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
against the federal government.198
The (b)(2) class action, less well known than the damages class action
under Rule 23(b)(3), requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.”199 This provision, drafted in order to accommodate de-
segregation litigation in the middle of the twentieth century,200 seems like an
196. For example, Congress could employ “agency class actions” in order to resolve
common issues in a single proceeding, rather than across multiple ones. See generally Shannon
M. Grammel & Joshua C. Macey, The Costs of Aggregating Administrative Claims, 70 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 123 (2018); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency
Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2012); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmer-
man, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017).
197 . See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM.
LAW INST. 1982).
Finally, I cannot leave Mendoza without noting a bitter irony of Justice Rehnquist’s posi-
tion. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Parklane because, in part, he worried about an asymmetry
that would favor the federal government. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 355–56 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Justice Rehnquist asserted that offensive nonmutual issue preclusion “will have the
result of coercing defendants to agree to consent orders or settlements in agency enforcement
actions,” and therefore the Court’s decision “added a powerful club to the administrative agen-
cies’ arsenals that even Congress was unwilling to provide them.” Id . And yet, five years later,
he tilted the scales further in favor of the government, giving it a new club in the form an ex-
emption from Parklane. See supra Section I.B.
198 . See, e .g ., Bray, supra note 1, at 475–76; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 366–68. Jack
Ratliff (among others) also argues that class actions would ameliorate many of the perceived
downsides of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Ratliff, supra note 69. And Richard Na-
gareda (among others) notes the deep conceptual connections between class actions and non-
mutual preclusion. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the
Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003).
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See generallyMaureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J.
843 (2016). For a court to certify a (b)(2) class, the usual requirements of Rule 23(a) also must
be satisfied. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (discussing numerosity, typicality, commonality, and ad-
equacy).
200 . See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; David Marcus,
Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011).
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obvious candidate in national-injunction litigation. Many critics of national
injunctions suggest that plaintiffs should seek a national (b)(2) class action
so that any “national” injunction would still be limited to parties.201 This log-
ic also seems like a response to critics ofMendoza—you do not need nonmu-
tual preclusion when you can convert nonparties into parties using the
formal procedures of Rule 23.
But there is a problem with this simple command: at the same time as
national injunctions have become more popular, the ability to obtain a na-
tional (b)(2) class has waned. Some of the challenges have come from within
class-action law. Wal-Mart v . Dukes, for example, articulated a principle of
“indivisibility” applicable to (b)(2) classes202 that has been used by lower
courts to cut off class certification where it would have seemed possible be-
fore Wal-Mart.203 If a federal agency adopted for its employees exactly the
policy that plaintiffs alleged was discriminatory in Wal-Mart, wouldn’t a
court be compelled to deny class certification in the government case?204 If
the government applied a Wal-Mart-like policy to the approval of asylum
claims or security clearances or disability benefits, wouldn’t courts be com-
pelled to deny class certification in cases challenging those policies too?205
Though not ruling on a policy exactly like Wal-Mart’s, the Supreme Court
last term instructed a lower court to consider the applicability of Wal-Mart
to a class action challenging the federal government’s use of indefinite deten-
tion during immigration proceedings.206
201 . See, e .g ., Bray, supra note 1, at 475–76; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 367–68.
202. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360–61 (2011).
203 . See Carroll, supra note 199, at 875–902; Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Ac-
tions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 788–92 (2013); Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action
Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 366–75 (2017); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93
B.U. L. REV. 441, 463–75 (2013). For examples of Wal-Mart being used to deny class certifica-
tion in injunctive-relief cases, see Phillips v . Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (7th Cir.
2016), and Jamie S . v . Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012).
204 . See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 344–45 (“[Plaintiffs] claim that their local managers’ dis-
cretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an
unlawful disparate impact on female employees. And, [plaintiffs] say, because Wal–Mart is
aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate treat-
ment.” (citations omitted)); Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 18–20 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing
extensive set of stipulations agreed to in response to the liability determination); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming district court’s decision finding that the Drug
Enforcement Agency engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in employment).
205. As noted supra note 204, a central problem with the Wal-Mart class was that it was
objecting to a policy that devolved discretion to local managers—a pattern that could easily be
replicated in these other contexts.
206. Specifically, in Jennings v . Rodriguez, a class of detained immigrants sought an in-
junction against indefinite detention by the federal government. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The Su-
preme Court rejected the immigrants’ statutory claim but remanded for consideration of their
due process claim. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841–52. At the end of the opinion, Justice Alito also
invited the Ninth Circuit to consider on remand whether (b)(2) certification was appropriate:
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Potential problems exist even if we move away from theWal-Martmod-
el. In the suits to challenge the constitutionality of the Travel Ban, it is not
clear that a single class could have included state universities, travel agents,
putative refugees, and all others affected by the Executive Order.207 And in
the suit to challenge the Trump Administration’s “child separation” policy,
the government vigorously opposed class certification on various grounds.208
The court ultimately certified a class of all parents with children detained
and separated at the border, though the court excluded those apprehended
in the interior of the United States.209 Meanwhile, some courts have applied a
so-called necessity doctrine to deny class certification when the court could
issue a broad decree in an individual suit.210 So, even if there were some ide-
alized (b)(2) that would cover all of the major government cases, it is not
clear that today’s federal courts would agree.211
Meanwhile, developments in other areas of law have further imperiled
(b)(2) classes. For one, the Supreme Court has narrowed the law of Arti-
The Court of Appeals should also consider whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
continues to be the appropriate vehicle for respondents’ claims in light of Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc . v . Dukes. We held in Dukes that “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single
injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”
That holding may be relevant on remand because the Court of Appeals has already
acknowledged that some members of the certified class may not be entitled to bond
hearings as a constitutional matter. Assuming that is correct, then it may no longer be
true that the complained-of “conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlaw-
ful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”
Id . at 851–52 (citations omitted) (quotingWal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360); see alsoMaureen Carroll
et al., Government Class Actions After Jennings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 8,
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/government-class-actions-after-jennings-v-rodriguez
[https://perma.cc/PFK6-L3PK] (discussing this decision); Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, In-
divisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59 (2019).
207 . See, e .g ., Frost, supra note 1, at 130 (noting this issue). One potential problem would
be if a court required that the class be “currently and readily ascertainable,” as the Third Cir-
cuit does. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marcus v.
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
208 . See Respondent-Defendants’ Opposition to Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Cal.
2018) (No. 18-CV-428 DMSMDD).
209. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 18CV0428 DMS (MDD), slip op.
at 11, 17 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) (order granting in part class certification). The order also
excluded from the class definition individuals with communicable diseases or criminal histo-
ries. Id . at 11.
210 . See M.R. v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 286 F.R.D. 510, 518 & n.11 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (col-
lecting cases); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common
Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2026–27, 2077–79 (2015) (describ-
ing and criticizing this doctrine). Carroll also describes the various incentives that encourage
plaintiffs to pursue individual rather than class relief, even for “aggregate” claims. Id . at 2027–
39.
211 . Cf . Carroll, supra note 199, at 850 (“[I]t is unclear whether the paradigmatic post-
Brown desegregation cases could be certified as class actions under today’s restrictive stand-
ards.”).
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cle III standing.212 At a minimum, named plaintiffs must articulate a con-
crete and particularized injury,213 and some have argued that all members of
the class must establish their standing.214 Applying these requirements in
major public-law cases might exclude potential plaintiffs whose injuries are
as-of-yet speculative.215 Other challenges to named plaintiffs also could im-
peril the class. For example, in the “child separation” case mentioned above,
the government argued that because one named plaintiff’s claims were moot
and the other named plaintiff lacked proper venue, the entire class action
should be dismissed.216
212 . See Zachary D. Clopton, Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1440 (2018) (collecting cases and sources). See generally Heather Elliott,
The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
213 . See, e .g ., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016). See generally Ra-
chel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. &MARY L. REV. 2285 (2018) (dis-
cussing Spokeo).
214. Some have called for the Supreme Court to require Article III standing for every
member of the class, not just the named plaintiff. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plain-
tiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 486 (2017); Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolida-
tion on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be (pt. 1), 42
UCLA L. REV. 717, 726–50 (1995); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036,
1053 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Article III does not give federal courts the power to
order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.”); Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 14, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018 WL
3456069. But see Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 897 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“[A]s long as the named plaintiffs have standing to sue the named defendants, any concern
about whether it is proper for a class to include out‐of‐state, nonparty class members with
claims subject to different state laws is a question of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), not a
question of ‘adjudicatory competence’ under Article III.” (citation omitted) (quoting Morrison
v. YTB Int’l, Inc., 649 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011))).
215. The scholarship of Wasserman, Morley, and Bruhl suggests that national injunc-
tions might be problematic, in part, because they protect parties who would lack Article III
standing on their own. See Bruhl, supra note 214, at 511–14; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class
Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Oth-
er Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 523–27 (2016); Wasserman, supra
note 1, at 359–63. The federal government has taken this position as well. See Supplemental
Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 9–15 (“[W]here no class has been certified, no justiciable
controversy exists once the injury to the actual plaintiffs has been remedied.”); OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEYGEN., supra note 35, at 1–3.
The rise of nonmutual preclusion also calls into question the logic of this view. If a non-
party who could not have obtained standing would be a candidate for nonmutual preclusion,
then why is it so anomalous to include that person within the scope of the initial injunction?
For additional responses to the Article III-based critique, see Frost, supra note 1.
216 . See Respondent-Defendants’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D.
Cal. 2018) (No. 18-CV-428 DMS MDD); see also Ms . L ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1156–59 (rejecting
these arguments). For a discussion of strategies to moot pending class actions, see Clopton,
supra note 212.
Personal jurisdiction also could be an issue, especially in cases purporting to join nonfed-
eral defendants. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–84
(2017). Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb did not explicit-
ly apply to class actions, it might soon. See id . at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
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As a result of these developments, there may be cases in which Parklane
would dictate nonmutual preclusion but—for other doctrinal reasons—
plaintiffs would be unable to certify a (b)(2) class.217 I raise this issue not to
criticize those other doctrines, though I have my problems with them. In-
stead, these decisions also cast new light on the effects of Mendoza. At the
time of Mendoza, it may have appeared that the (b)(2) class action would
cover up any unfairness resulting from preferential preclusion rules for the
federal government.218 But under the law today, that may not be true. As the
gap between (b)(2) and nonmutual preclusion increases, the magnitude of
the “governmental advantage” also increases. And as explained above, this
growing governmental advantage is not justified by Mendoza’s policy argu-
ments.219
In sum,Mendoza was wrong when it was decided: the government is not
always different from other litigants; the law of preclusion contains excep-
tions necessary to protect the public interest; and there are affirmative values
of preclusion that apply equally to government and nongovernment litiga-
tion. Mendoza is even more wrong today: other legal developments have
made it more difficult for those aggrieved by the government to achieve uni-
versal relief up front, so the inability to rely on nonmutual preclusion is even
more consequential in this growing number of cases.220 For these reasons,
the Supreme Court or Congress should overrule Mendoza independent of
any changes to the law of national injunctions.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FORNATIONAL INJUNCTIONS
The foregoing Part made the case to overrule Mendoza, putting the gov-
ernment on equal preclusion footing with other litigants. What, then, does
Mendoza have to say about national injunctions?
Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a
class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class
of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there.”).
217. Indeed, an early commentator on Parklane conceptualized the effect of nonmutuali-
ty as creating a “collateral class action” among those who could benefit from nonmutual pre-
clusion. See Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral
Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 660 (1980). And, as noted above, class actions are often of-
fered as alternatives to nonmutual preclusion. See Ratliff, supra note 69.
218. This is analogous to the national-injunction critics’ argument about (b)(2). See supra
note 201 and accompanying text.
219. Overruling Mendoza thus has the added benefit of avoiding any further distortions
in the aforementioned court-access doctrines (Rule 23, standing, etc.), as courts will not be
tempted to adjust those doctrines to compensate for an inequality in preclusion. Cf . Fallon,
supra note 120, at 637 (“[C]ourts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking
what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, sub-
stantive rights, and available remedies. When facing an outcome or pattern of outcomes that it
regards as practically intolerable or disturbingly sub-optimal, the Court will adjust or manipu-
late the applicable law.” (footnote omitted)).
220 . Cf . Frost, supra note 1, at 1090–1103 (making similar policy arguments in the con-
text of national injunctions); Malveaux, supra note 1, at 62–64 (same).
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First, and contrary to claims of national-injunction critics, Mendoza
does not compel a prohibition on national injunctions. As noted above,
Mendoza might be read to suggest that the propriety of nonparty-protecting
relief is a matter of policy—not history or structure.221
This emphasis on policy does not mean that Mendoza’s specific policy
arguments are instructive in this context. Indeed, these arguments are poor
fits for the national-injunctions debate. Recall that the Mendoza Court em-
phasized the substantial number of lawsuits against the federal government,
each of which—if resolved against the government—could affect numerous
other cases.222 Even if this concern were valid in the context of issue preclu-
sion, it does not resolve the national-injunctions debate. National injunc-
tions are only contemplated in a relatively small number of cases.223 The
government should not be taken by surprise if an injunction in such a case
has consequences beyond those parties. And when a national injunction is-
sues, it would make sense for the government to quickly appeal.224
In addition, the Mendoza Court worried about percolation,225 and the
U.S. government has made this argument in national-injunction cases as
well.226 But a policy preference in favor of percolation is not a trump card. In
Califano v . Yamasaki, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
percolation countenanced against nationwide class actions but declined to
issue a categorical rule against them.227 And, of course, Parklane itself has the
effect of reducing percolation, but that was no obstacle to the Supreme
Court.228 Moreover, national-injunction cases are seemingly weak candidates
221 . See supra Section II.B.
222 . See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159–61 (1984).
223 . See, e .g ., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[O]nce a
court determines that preliminary relief is required, the court must be able to engage in the
‘equitable balancing’ to determine the relief necessary. Rarely, that will include nationwide in-
junctions.”); City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
13, 2017) (“[I]ssuing a nationwide injunction should not be a default approach. It is an ex-
traordinary remedy that should be limited by the nature of the constitutional violation and
subject to prudent use by the courts.”).
224 . See supra Section III.A. Indeed, that is what we have seen in cases when courts is-
sued national injunctions related to the Travel Ban, sanctuary cities, DACA, and more. See,
e .g ., City of Chicago, 888 F.3d 272 (sanctuary cities); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2017) (Travel Ban); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (DACA).
225 . See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
226 . See Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 21–23; see also OFFICE OF
THEATTORNEYGEN., supra note 35, at 4.
227. 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979) (“It often will be preferable to allow several courts to
pass on a given class claim in order to gain the benefit of adjudication by different courts in
different factual contexts. For this reason, a federal court when asked to certify a nationwide
class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before
it, and that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of
similar issues in other judicial districts. But we decline to adopt the extreme position that such
a class may never be certified.”).
228 . See supra Section I.B. Indeed, that was part of the point. See supra note 79 (noting
connection to the perceived litigation crisis).
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for a percolation argument, given that they proceed quickly to appellate (if
not Supreme Court) review and involve numerous interveners and amici cu-
riae who can provide the functional equivalent of district-court percola-
tion.229 For the same reason, even if a single district court attempted to “lock
in” the federal government via national injunction,230 the government could
quickly appeal the adverse ruling,231 and in many cases the Supreme Court
would soon provide a “national” resolution.232
In short, not only are Mendoza’s justifications weak as applied to issue
preclusion, they are even weaker when translated to national injunctions.
There may be good policy reasons to oppose national injunctions, but those
reasons do not derive fromMendoza.
That said, a decision to overruleMendoza would have salutary effects for
the national-injunctions issue—and it would point to a way forward that
might accommodate all sides in the national-injunctions debate. The balance
of this Part looks first at the consequences of overrulingMendoza on nation-
al injunctions and then asks how overruling Mendoza fits with proposals to
prohibit or limit national injunctions.
A. Preclusion and National Injunctions
Consider two lawsuits seeking to enjoin the federal government. In one
version, a fastidious plaintiff files a lawsuit in federal court seeking the
broadest possible class definition. The court finds a constitutional or statuto-
ry violation, for example, by concluding that a particular executive policy
was motivated by animus.233 But because of limits imposed by current law—
Rule 23, standing, or others234—the court cannot certify a class sufficiently
broad to cover potential future claimants who are only subject to the specu-
229. And, of course, a court could consider percolation when deciding the scope of in-
junctive relief. See, e .g ., City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 290 (“[O]nce a court determines that pre-
liminary relief is required, the court must be able to engage in the ‘equitable balancing’ to de-
determine the relief necessary. Rarely, that will include nationwide injunctions. Granted, it is
an imprecise process, but that is endemic to injunctions, and courts are capable of weighing the
appropriate factors while remaining cognizant of the hazards of forum shopping and duplica-
tive lawsuits.”). Cf . Califano, 442 U.S. at 702–03 (making a similar point with respect to the
certification of nationwide classes).
230 . See supra Section III.A.
231. Preliminary injunctions, though not final judgments, are immediately appealable in
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). See generally 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3921 (3d ed. 2012).
232 . See, e .g ., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
233 . See, e .g ., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558–59 (D. Md.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); see also
Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012) (attempting
to systematize precedent on animus and state action); Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit:
Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 137–40 (2017) (discussing issues of presi-
dential intent).
234 . See supra Section III.C.
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lative threat of injury. What happens to these future claimants? If the Su-
preme Court were to overrule Mendoza, then they could get the benefit of
Parklane (because they could not have joined the first case) whenever their
claims are ripe.235 And, even though nonmutual preclusion is not guaran-
teed,236 the threat of preclusion may deter the federal government from
treating them in a way that would have violated the court’s decision. The re-
sult is nonparty protection without a nonparty injunction.
In a second version, imagine that challengers to a federal statute strate-
gically sequence their lawsuits. The first plaintiff sues in the district most
likely to grant an injunction; if she loses, a new plaintiff tries in the district
next most likely to grant relief; if both lose, yet another new plaintiff tries
again in a third district.237 None of these plaintiffs seeks a mandatory class
action, which would bind the entire class.238 Eventually one of these plaintiffs
finds a judge willing to issue an injunction. In this situation, nonparties
should not benefit from nonmutual preclusion even if the Court overruled
Mendoza—the putative plaintiffs who were “waiting and seeing” should be
denied the benefit of nonmutual preclusion because they could have easily
joined the prior suit.239 This is a public-law version of Currie’s train crash
and its multiple plaintiff anomaly.240 And Parklane has a built-in response to
this situation, denying preclusion as unfair.241
The foregoing hypotheticals illustrate the benefits of Parklane’s screen-
ing approach. The most heavily criticized aspects of national injunctions—
the multiple plaintiff anomaly and the risk of inconsistent adjudications—
are minimized. Their virtues—protecting those who cannot join the first case
and discouraging government noncompliance—are maintained. And alt-
hough “forum shopping” might still occur, without the multiple plaintiff
anomaly the forum shopping in these cases is not so different from the fo-
235. Questions such as animus would be prime candidates for issue preclusion. If the
second court considered the issue to be “pure law” and the claims to be unrelated, it is possible
that the government could avoid preclusion based on the Moser exception. See supra note 174
and accompanying text. But that result would not depend on the governmental status of the
defendant and instead would just return the government to equal footing with other litigants.
236. Preclusion is not guaranteed because of the Parklane discretion discussed supra Sec-
tion I.B.
237. This version mirrors those hypothetical cases that critics of national injunctions
hold out as reasons to prohibit the practice. See, e .g ., Bray, supra note 1, at 464–65.
238 . See generallyWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4455.
239 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
240 . See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
241 . See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29. Im-
portantly, nothing here should be read as contrary to the principle that a court may issue in-
junctions broad enough “to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
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rum shopping that we usually tolerate.242 Here, too, overruling Mendoza has
the effect of “normalizing” government litigation.243
Because nonmutual preclusion can protect some nonparties, overruling
Mendoza would lower the pressure on courts to issue national injunctions in
the first place. Today, a federal court inclined to stop a constitutional or stat-
utory violation by federal defendants must turn to the national injunction;
otherwise, its decisions could be ignored because they are not binding on
other courts.244 Parties seeking injunctions face the same dynamic. These
worries are minimized when federal courts deal with nongovernmental de-
fendants because nonmutual preclusion (and full faith and credit)245 will en-
sure that court judgments are not so easily ignored.246 Allowing nonmutual
preclusion against the federal government, even on a case-by-case basis, will
thus reduce the pressure to award universal relief because some future plain-
tiffs might be able to invoke the prior judgment. And, again, the threat of
nonmutual preclusion should discourage the government from flouting the
first court’s decision.
Nonmutual preclusion also harnesses party incentives to achieve the
goal of a single resolution binding on all sides. Today, plaintiffs may be in-
centivized to strategically pursue national injunctions in multiple proceed-
242 . See, e .g ., The Atlantic Star, [1974] AC 436 (HL) 471 (Eng.) (“ ‘Forum shopping’ is a
dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of juris-
dictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably
presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.”); Pamela K. Book-
man, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2016). See
generallyHuddleston, supra note 1.
243 . Cf . Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (explaining how the Supreme Court has normalized for-
eign relations law). Of course, relying on preclusion instead of an injunction has its costs. Pre-
clusion puts the burden on future litigants to assert it, and future courts would have to decide
whether Parklane applies to new plaintiffs. Still, litigating preclusion is cheaper than relitigat-
ing the merits, and it comes with lesser risks of inconsistent judgments. See supra Section III.B
(discussing the justifications for preclusion). And, again, preclusion might tamp down on non-
acquiescence.
244. As Wasserman notes, the Seventh Circuit seemingly justified its approval of a na-
tional injunction against the federal government’s sanctuary cities policy, in part, because judi-
cial economy counseled against asking every sanctuary city to sue. See Wasserman, supra note
1, at 345 (citing City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 292 (7th Cir. 2018)).
245 . See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–08 (2001) (full
faith and credit among federal courts); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit
Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (full faith and credit statute). See generally Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986).
246 . See supra Section I.B. Importantly, preliminary injunctions may be candidates for
issue preclusion. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 474
n. 11 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[F]indings made in granting or denying preliminary injunctions can
have preclusive effect if the circumstances make it likely that the findings are ‘sufficiently firm’
to persuade the court that there is no compelling reason for permitting them to be litigated
again.” (quoting Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1980))); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13, illus. 1; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, §§ 4434, 4465.2.
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ings—a central critique offered by national-injunction critics.247 Parklane
denies preclusion to wait-and-see plaintiffs, so they gain no advantage from
sitting on the sidelines.248 Instead, it would be in their interest to contribute
to the first case in hopes of swaying the result. Moreover, because nonmutual
preclusion is not assured, plaintiffs interested in universal relief who are al-
ready in the case should pursue a class action when possible, exactly as critics
of national injunctions have advised.249
On the flipside, while calls for plaintiffs to use (b)(2) class actions do not
offer any guidance to federal defendants,250 Parklane provides a roadmap.
Federal defendants would have an incentive to make sure potential plaintiffs
are notified of the litigation, thus inducing them to join the case or lose their
access to nonmutual preclusion. Federal defendants also might not fight so
vigorously against attempts at intervention or class certification that seek to
bring all potential claimants into the first case.251 The result would be that
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts would work together to achieve a single
binding resolution—a result that all sides seem to desire.
B. The Future of National Injunctions
Even if Mendoza remained good law, connecting preclusion and injunc-
tions would offer a new vantage on when national injunctions might be justi-
fied.
Suppose that judges or legislators were interested in ways to limit (but
not categorically prohibit) national injunctions.252 In that circumstance,
nonmutual preclusion offers guidance about the prudential considerations
that could attend to nonparty relief. In particular, a court considering an ap-
plication for a national injunction might ask itself the questions raised by
247 . See supra Section I.A.
248. For example, in the DACA litigation, the Southern District of Texas concluded that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge DACA and likely would succeed on the merits, but that a
preliminary injunction was not justified in part because it conflicted with prior federal court
decisions upholding DACA. See Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Tex. 2018).
This, too, resonates with Parklane’s limits on nonmutual preclusion. See supra Section I.B.
249 . See, e .g ., Bray, supra note 1, at 456; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 368; see also Carroll,
supra note 210, at 2052–55 (making a similar point about the virtue of class treatment).
250 . See supra note 1 (collecting sources).
251 . See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 24. Though defendants’ acquiescence is not supposed to affect
the class certification decision as a legal matter, it is hard to imagine that this does not happen
as a practical matter. See, e .g ., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356–67 (1995); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Ac-
tions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 470–74 (2000). I also have speculated elsewhere that the government
might try to use multidistrict litigation to achieve this effect. See Bradt & Clopton, supra note
58 (exploring this possibility and arguing that the MDL panel should reject it).
252. If the Supreme Court or Congress prohibited national injunctions, see, e .g ., Injunc-
tive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018), then nonmutual
preclusion could ameliorate some of the effects in line with the discussion in the previous sec-
tion.
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Parklane.253 Although “predicting” preclusion is not always easy,254 courts
could decline to issue national injunctions when nonparties likely would not
be candidates for nonmutual preclusion.255
Using the examples from above, if a court observed wait-and-see plain-
tiffs and the strategic avoidance of class certification, it should be disinclined
to grant a national injunction that would protect nonparties in a way that
preclusion would not. And presumably a federal defendant opposing a na-
tional injunction would alert a court to the presence of wait-and-see plain-
tiffs.256 But if the court observed a category of potential plaintiffs who could
not intervene—either because of doctrinal barriers or because they are still
unidentifiable as a practical matter—then an injunction protecting nonpar-
ties seems more reasonable.257 One implication, therefore, is that national
injunctions may be more justified in the penumbra around Rule 23(b)(2).
When parties would like to heed the calls of critics and seek a (b)(2) class ac-
tion,258 but current law prevents it,259 a court might approximate the effect of
nonmutual preclusion by issuing a national injunction.260
253. Most naturally, a court might consider these questions as part of the usual balancing
of interests. See, e .g ., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[O]nce a
court determines that preliminary relief is required, the court must be able to engage in the
‘equitable balancing’ to determine the relief necessary. Rarely, that will include nationwide in-
junctions. Granted, it is an imprecise process, but that is endemic to injunctions, and courts are
capable of weighing the appropriate factors while remaining cognizant of the hazards of forum
shopping and duplicative lawsuits.”). Similarly, Professor Linda Mullenix argued that Park-
lane’s discretionary factors should be incorporated into her proposed federal statute dealing
with mass torts. Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1081 (1986).
254 . See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A court conducting an action cannot predetermine
the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.”).
255. The most committed legal realist might say that every judge inclined to issue a na-
tional injunction under today’s law would also issue a national injunction under a Parklane-
based regime. Perhaps, but if legal rules had no effect at all, then would not the same judge also
certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class just to be safe? I tend to think that legal rules can have some effect,
and I proceed here based on that assumption. And I discuss below the benefits of this particu-
lar legal principle for the policymaking choices of Congress and the courts.
256. One could tell a similar story about inconsistent judgments. Federal defendants
would have incentives to alert courts to prior inconsistent judgments, which would trigger
Parklane’s discretion (and thus would imply that the court might deny a nonparty-protecting
injunction). See supra Section I.B (discussing Parklane).
257. Or, returning to the change-in-administration issue, if a court observed that the fed-
eral defendant was a lame-duck executive offering a weak defense in order to lock in its succes-
sor, then the court might conclude it would be unfair to extend the outcome to nonparties. See
supra Section III.A (discussing this issue in the context ofMendoza).
258 . See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
259 . See supra Section III.C.
260. One might think that this approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith v . Bayer Corp ., in which the Supreme Court rejected an injunction against a state court
that purported to dictate the preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment. 564 U.S. 299 (2011);
see Howard Wasserman, Universality as Judicial Impatience and Control, PRAFWSBLAWG (May
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Linking the national-injunctions framework to preclusion serves various
goals. Bringing preclusion and remedy into closer alignment clarifies the
stakes.261 Rather than having the effects on nonparties hidden in multiple in-
quiries, this approach enables courts and parties to focus on the issues in
light of a clear sense of the consequences.262 Bringing these standards togeth-
er also makes things easier for future lawmakers, who might fail to appreci-
ate the multifarious pathways to nonparty protection.263
There is also value in reframing the national-injunctions debate in terms
of the common law of preclusion rather than in terms of history or constitu-
tional structure.264 Questions of preclusion and remedial scope are matters of
policy that are—and should remain—subject to the normal lawmaking pro-
cess.265 Congress can legislate preclusion, and Congress should be the branch
that addresses national injunctions.266 Framing the national-injunctions de-
bate in terms of the separation of powers, however, risks tempting the Su-
preme Court into an Article III decision, which would disempower the
legislative process.267
CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas chided defenders of national injunctions because their
arguments “at best ‘boi[l] down to a policy judgment’ about how powers
24, 2018, 7:26 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/universality-as-
judicial-impatience-and-control.html [https://perma.cc/44RA-HECZ] (drawing exactly this
connection). But Bayer was interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012), as
applied to a federal-court injunction against a state court. Special considerations apply in that
context because Congress has spoken to the issue and because of deep commitments to federal-
ism. See Bayer, 564 U.S. at 317–18; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 4405.1. Even in those cir-
cumstances, Bayer did not completely rule out preclusion injunctions. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 306–
07. Instead, much of the analysis turned on the fact that the injunction purported to apply to
different issues and to bind nonparties. Id . at 308–18. In other words, the problem with the
injunction was that exceeded the scope of preclusion, not that it was intended to enforce it.
261 . See supra note 182 (discussing this issue).
262. This argument reflects a similar intuition to requiring something like “foreseeabil-
ity” for preclusion to attach. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28–29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
263. Again, these lawmakers include both judges and legislators who (typically) address
only one aspect of nonparty protection at a time.
264 . See generally supra note 1 (collecting sources).
265. Estreicher and Revesz reach a similar conclusion about agency nonacquiescence.
See, e .g ., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 6, at 754 (“Where Congress has provided in an agen-
cy’s governing statute that nonacquiescence should be treated in a particular manner, that de-
termination must control.”).
266 . See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing lawmaking and preclusion).
267 . See Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 9–15; OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 35; cf ., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19,
87–101 (1990) (calling for the Court to deconstitutionalize personal jurisdiction in favor of
legislative solutions).
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ought to be allocated among our three branches of government.”268 But of
course they do. History and structure do not provide unambiguous answers
about the scope of injunctions. There may be good reasons that federal judg-
es should not universally enjoin federal defendants, but those reasons should
be matters of policy judgment, not constitutional law or history.
268. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
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